Zusammenfassung der Ressource
Motivation and Public Policy
- Public Services and the Market
- Arguments for marketising
education and health
- efficiency
- value neutrality
- self-reliance
- arguments against marketising
- the indigent cannot
be allowed to die
- equality of opportunity
requires universal education
- Richard Titmuss
- a private market in blood is
allocatively inefficient and
produces contaminated blood
- a private system is
more expensive
- the market redistributes
in the wrong direction
- marketising what can be done
voluntarily degrades society:
altruistic motives are driven out
by self-interested ones
- marketisation and
the degradation of
society
- motivations of givers: pure
altruism, reciprocity, recognition of
past or future benefits recieved.
- voluntary activity
as a kind of freedom
- economist says that if the voluntary way of giving blood is inefficient
compared to the American system of paying for blood. But Titmuss
wanted to show that the British system is more efficient and overall better
- why is it better?
- if you pay for
blood, you get bad
blood
- private system is more expensive
- market redistributed bloody in wrong direction. poor
people give all of the blood because they need the
money and the blood ends up in those who can afford it
- making something in to a market that could be
done voluntarily is degrading to society. there is
something noble about doing something for
another person
- Le Grand
- points of agreements with Titmuss
- the contamination argument
- the corruption argument
- points of disagreement with Titmuss
- the UK system turned out to
be less allocatively efficient
than it appeared in 1970
- Titmuss' picture of
public services
involve omnipotent
professionals and
passive citizens
- terminology
- Knight
- a public sector
professional who
is motivated by
altruism
- Knave
- a public sector
professional
motivated by
self-interest
- Pawn
- a citizen who is the passive
recipient of public services
- Queen
- a citizen who has
significant say in the
nature of the public
services she recieves
- in designing public services the designer must
work out whether the public sector
professionals/workers are knights or knaves.
- people are altruistic
where the cost to them
is not too great
- where they need to
be paid, they are
happy to accept low
payment as
recogition
- examples of foster carers
- Higher pay
drives out
altruism
- Exit Vs Voice
- in order to
achieve voice,
citizens must rely
on politicians
- voice mechanisms tended
to be dominated by the
well-to-do and articulate
- exit means giving
citizens choice
between providers
- this too can lead to
preferential access
for the better off
- Le Grand considers
exit more effective
- three models of service delivery
- command and control
- the "trust" or "network" model
- the quasi-market = le Grands preferred model
- it combines market with non-market
features: universal equal provision on the
other hand, choice of providers on the other
- citizens are queens
- providers are assumed to have a mix of
knavish and knightly motivations - but do
the former drive out the latter?
- overview
- a quasi-market is when a
public-service retains what it
is to be a public service but is
re-engineered so it has some
virtues of the market
- people are selfish and
rational maximisers of
their own utility
- quasi-markets are a
compromise between the
two competing elements
- more efficient -
provide choice and
liberty
- cannot be left entirely to the
market. equality of
opportunity requires
universal education.
- defenders of the welfare state argue people are not entirely selfish, but you
can make public services run effectively by appealing to people's better
nature. so we need to create the circumstances to allow us to act altruistically.