Zusammenfassung der Ressource
Philosophy of
Mind
- SUBSTANCE DUALISM
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- FOR
- LAW OF IDENTITY ARGUMENTS
- INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION ARGUMENT
- CRITICISMS
- INITIAL OBJECTIONS
- Mind cannot be scientifically investigated
- Evolution
- Localisation
- THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
- (a) Interactionism
- (b) Parallelism
- (c) Epiphenomenalism
- THE PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM
- Origins of the Problem
- The Cartesian Legacy
- Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument
- THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
- The Argument from Analogy
- Problems with the argument from analogy
- Wittgenstein's criteriological response to the problem of other minds
- REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM
- LOGICAL BEHAVIOURISM
- FOR
- It doesn't face the problem of mental causation
- It avoids the problem of other minds
- CRITICISMS
- Behaviourism is vague (problems with dispositions)
- Can we apply a behaviourist account to our own mental states?
- Behaviour is caused by mental states
- Qualia
- MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY
- FOR
- No nomological danglers
- The most economical explanation (satisfies Occam's Razor)
- CRITICISMS
- Individual Differences
- The Identity is conceived too narrowly
- Irreducibility of consciousness (QUALIA)
- The conceivability argument
- FUNCTIONALISM
- CRITICISMS
- The Problem of Qualia
- Inverted Qualia
- Absent Qualia
- Blockhead Example
- The Problem of Intentionality
- Searle's Chinese Room Argument
- Objections
- The Systems Objection
- Searle's Response
- The Robot Objection
- Dennett's Defence of Functionalism in response to Searle
- FOR
- Improvement on other materialist theories
- Less species-chauvinist
- Closely linked to research programmes in relevant disciplines
- Research of computer scientists
- Research of cognitive scientists
- Research into biological teleology
- NON-REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM
- Emergentism
- Supervenience
- PROPERTY DUALISM
- EPIPHENOMENALISM
- SEARLE'S BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM
- CRITICISMS
- Objection to Searle's Micro/Macro Analogy
- Searle wants it both ways (materialist and dualist)
- Searle rejects reductive materialism
- Biological Naturatism is a form of property dualism
- Searle rejects any version of dualism
- Why I am Not a Property Dualist (2002)
- Causally reducible
- Ontologically irreducible
- The Traditional Terminology
- Searle says conscious states are:
- Ontologically subjective
- Qualitative
- Have intentionality
- Have a spatial location
- explained through microphysical processes
- causally efficacious
- ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
- FOR
- It simplifies our ontology
- Removes mind/body interaction body
- CRITICISMS
- Eliminative Materialism is counter-intuitive
- Eliminative Materialism is self-refuting
- Is folk psychology as hopeless as eliminative materialism suggests?
- Nothing changes except terminology - Norman Malcolm
- Patricia Churchland's Response
- Many of the criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the theory
- Nothing is eliminated, rather EM is about the level of explanation
- She would rather call it Revisionary Materialism
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