Loading [MathJax]/jax/output/HTML-CSS/fonts/TeX/fontdata.js
Maria Angela Samonte
Mindmap von , erstellt am more than 1 year ago

Philosophy

20
0
0
Maria Angela Samonte
Erstellt von Maria Angela Samonte vor fast 9 Jahre
Bewerte diese Ressource, indem du auf die Sterne unten klickst:
1 2 3 4 5 (0)
Bewertungen (0)
0
0
0
0
0

0 Kommentare

There are no comments, be the first and leave one below:

Schließen
Philosophy - Ontological argumentAnselmDescartes'a supremely perfectbeing'In thiscontext,perfectionmeans'flawless' or'lacking anyfaults'modernversionsNormanMalcolmAlvinPlantingamust exist toavoid beingself-contradictory.develops Proslogion3Proslogion 2, existence, predicate.Proslogion 3 doesn't treat existence as apredicate: necessary.infinitepossibilitiesA possible world = acomplete way thatthings could be. NOT'another world', i.e. aphysical EarthA possible world, exists abeing w/ maximal greatness.only if it exists in everypossible world. DOESN'TMEAN G!To be maximally great, a being only has to be present in everypossible world. hasn't accounted, in each world, there may be a beingthat is more powerful, more knowing, more morally perfect, thanthis maximally great being. The fact that these beings may only befound in 1 possible world is irrelevant.To deal w/ this, concept of maximal excellence.Maximal greatness entails maximal excellence. Maximalexcellence entails omnipotence, omniscience, + moralperfection.1. There is a possible world inwhich there is a being that ismaximally great. 2. It hasmaximal excellence (entailedwithin maximal greatness). 3. Ifomnipotent, omniscient, andmorally perfect, and maximallygreat, it is existent in OURworld. IS a G.Gauniloresponse to,Proslogion 2MUST exist BC of itsperfectionnot valid in this context.never compares things ofa like kind above."...NOTHING...".Gaunilo, comparisonbetween ISLANDS.Plantinga: islands have nointrinsic maximum: can alwaysbe bettered (add another lagoon,sandy beach)Kantv Descartes, matches that definition IN REALITY,another Qv Anselm, saying X EXISTS tells one nothing aboutX (whereas X is FEMALE or TALL does). X ISdoesn't give info about X. The opp. statement,presents, paradoxIf X EXISTS tells us about a property that X has, then XDOESN'T EXIST denies that it has this property (oraffirms that it lacks it). But, how can that whichdoesn't exist LACK anything?BertrandRussellAnselm uses 'exist' incorrectly. can't be a predicate. Ifit were, "Men exist. Santa is a man. Therefore, Santaexists." a syllogism. Russell, not a property of things,but of the IDEAs of those things. To say that "dragonsdon't exist" = of all the things that exist, none ofthem are referred to by "dragon".Therefore, IS = toprovide an intention. E.g."A cow is quadruped withudders", intention = todescribe a cow. The factthat a cow exists providesan EXTENSION to myintension. EXISTENCE =an EXTENSION of anINTENTION.C = "TTWNGCBC" = simply thetotality of everything that can beconceived by the mind. Doesn'thave to be physical existence, oreven BE conceived, as long as it isconceivable.support Anselm's claimthat G is TTWNGCBC,but not, belief that thisproves G's existencein realityDavies: even if we accept that a being w/maximal excellence is POSSIBLE, +therefore it is POSSIBLE that such a beingexists in our world, it doesn't follow thatsuch a being ACTUALLY exists. C =maximal excellence is POSSIBLE, +therefore G is POSSIBLE, not ACTUAL.necessary = ref, eternal + transcendent nature of G.means, exists OUTSIDE humans' space + time but is ableto create + act WITHIN it. Anselm: if He didn't exist in thisway, humans wouldn't exist either.Brian Daviesrecognises Malcolm's attempt to distinguish betweenexistence + necessity. In relation to Frege's point, we canaccept existence only as a second-order predicate, but acceptnecessity as a first-order predicate. Therefore, Malcolm'sargument: G is necessary; therefore G 'is'."A pixie is a little man withpointed ears. Therefore, thereactually exists a pixie." must existin order to have those pointedears, the reasoning unacceptable'is': DEFINE something (e.g. a queenis a female monarch). or, explainthat there actually IS something(there is such a thing as a vampire)FregeFirst-order predicates, NATURE ofsomething (the horses are brown).Second-order predicates, CONCEPTS(the horses are numerous). Frege'sobjection to Anselm + Descartes: useexistence as a first-order predicate,actually a second-order predicate.the first use says nothing aboutexistence, in that it says nothing aboutan existent queen. But, does explainwhat 'queen' MEANS.second use, not DEFININGanything either. IMPLICTLYSUPPOSING its existence.C: Malcolm's argument favours moving onfrom the premise 'A pixie is a little man w/pointed ears' (first use) as a definition, to theconclusion 'exist' (an example of the seconduse).a priori: analysing the idea of G, doesn't depend on experience"All bears have bones" = analytic."All bears are brown" = synthetic,right or wrong, evidence.Ontological, 'G exists' = analytic.can't fail to be true.starts, 'G exists' is 'de dicto necessary'.De dicto necessity = how words, used.de dicto = 'of words'move from G's de dictonecessity to G's de renecessity (that G necessarilyexists in + of G's self,substance called G that cannot not-exist)1st version"That than which nothing greater can beconceived." an address to G. "Anselm believesalready and this is significant" -Vardy. Proslogion= a prayer + not a piece of philosophyThis definition is understood by believers + non-believers.'G exists' = analytic - true merely by analysing what it means to be G.Vardy: LOSTISLAND. ButAnselm replied,hadn't understoodhis argument.Anselm: only G hasall perfections,therefore onlyapplies to G, onlyG is 'TTWNGCBC',only G is the GPB.G would lacksomething thatbelongs toperfection (not,clear, whatcharacteristicsbelong toperfection).Gaunilo: G ismerely thegreatest ACTUALbeing just as theisland is thegreatest ACTUALisland = but thisISN'T what Anselmis saying. Anselm:G is the greatestPOSSIBLE being,only applies to GHis second restatement (response, Caterus'criticism) = 1. Whatever belongs to the essentialnature of something can't be denied of it. 2. G'sessence includes existence. 3. Existence must beaffirmed of G.did take into account the type of attack thatGaunilo made against Anselm's argument.Descartes: 1. The argument applies only to anabsolutely perfect + necessary being. can't,therefore, be applied to something like a lostisland. 2. Not everyone has to think of G, but ifthey do think of G then G cannot be thoughtnot to exist (link, Malcolm's). 3. G alone = thebeing whose essence entails G's existence.cannot be 2 or more such beings.Aqui rejects precisely the point that Descartes wants toaffirm. Descartes: can know G's essence + therefore we cansay that G must exist. Aqui doesn't think that G's essence isknowable to humans.The predicates follow from thesubject. But, all this tells us issomething about the IDEA of atriangle + not about whetherthere are any triangles."necessary for a unicorn tohave a horn", but this doesn'tprove there are any unicorns.named, illegitimate jump from ideas to ontos ('reality').Kant: necessity applies to propositions (like triangles have 3 angles) + not to anything in reality. NO necessary things.Kant: true, 3 sides, doesn't mean that there are any triangles or any unicorns.Kant: existence isn't a predicate or a perfection.1. If something adds nothing to the conceptof a thing, then it is not part of the thing'sessence. 2. Existence adds nothing toanything's concept - to say 100 thalers is realrather than imaginary doesn't add anycharacteristics to a thaler. 3. Existence isn'tpart of a thing's essence; it is not aperfection.Kant rejects 2.Existence is a possibleperfection. Kantimplies, howevermuch you develop theidea, must go outsideit by getting evidencefrom experience as towhether or not itexists. Kant: "amerchant can betterhis position by addinga few noughts to hiscash account." -'Critique of PureReason' p882nd version, chapter 3accepts that the first argumentfails. Malcolm beings by statingthat if G doesn't already exist, Gcan't come into existence, require acause, limited being. G's existenceis impossible or necessary. Couldonly be impossible if it werelogically absurd or contradictory,MUST be necessary.Hick: no way of getting rid of the 'if', if Gexists, exists necessarilyVardy: Plantinga: all Malcolm has shown, the greatest possiblebeing exists in some possible world, but not necessarily inthe real world.Vardy: To overcome this difficulty, differentiates between maximalexcellence (which entails omnipotence, omniscience + moral perfection) +maximal greatness (which entails the property 'has maximal excellence inevery possible world'). If G has maximal greatness, G must exist in everypossible world. However, Plantinga himself, NO-MAXIMALITY = the propertyin a world of having no maximally great being. If this is exemplified in 1possible world, it could be exemplified in every possible world.Vardy: Believers, activitiesPRESUME G's existence.Vardy: D.Z. Phillips + Fr. Gareth Moore: to talk of G's existence can't be considered to be talk about an object's existence. "God is not a substance" "talk of God is presupposed in the religious way of life."Norman Malcolm sees Anselm's argument as having the force of a grammatical observation. believers, talking of G's inescapable reality to them. Phillips: believer = "God's existence is that on which mywhole life is based." A parallel, Moore's example, equator. exists, real, doesn't mean, physical line. idea, all accept. We live in a form of line in which the equator is real. G = a reality within the believer'sform of life. those outside this community do not have any use for language about G. person who has no use for praise, for worship. G-talk has no reality. "God is not a thing. God is rather an idea withinthe form of life of the believing community." To the believer, G necessarily exists - like prime no.s exist for the mathematician.Ahluwalia: Paul Tillich: G doesn't 'exist' in theway that the things in the universe exist. G'sexistence is different from the existence ofanything else.Ahluwalia: can't bring something into existence just by defining it as superlative.Ahluwalia'Meditations'like Anselm + Plato before him, born w/ innate ideas -universally shared. concepts: equality, cause, shape, no.from birth, G. all the perfections = omniscience,omnipotence, + omnibenevolence.can't be separated from G's essence, "three angles equal to 2 right angles", triangle's essence.doesn't mean, mountain + valley combo in ourimaginations actually exist in the real world.Descartes: G's nature doesn't involve angles or valleys but perfections. unchangingAhluwalia: uses modal logic, concept of possible worlds.Ahluwalia: a. Explain Anselm's version of the ontological argument. Don'tneed to go into detail about any other versions, but, could mention them inpassing. Plan, main features: purpose, definition, distinction, necessary +contingent existence, differences between analytic + synthetic statements,way in which he arrives at his conclusion. key terms, specialist vocab. a.knowledge + understanding, save your criticisms. b. To what extent doesGaunilo's criticism of Anselm's argument succeed in demonstrating that theargument fails? Also show understanding of Anselm's response to it.Assessment, evaluative comment. other criticisms (Kant), more successfulthan Gaunilo's, deal w/ the issues explicitly raised in the Q.Doppelklick auf diesen KnotenKlicke und ziehe diese Schaltfläche, um einen neuen Knoten zu erstellen