Proprietary Estoppel:
A court may award an interest in land as a remedy against a land owner who has conducted himself in such a way that it is unconscionable for him to exert his legal right in the land.
This provides for the informal creation of interests in land where one has acted detrimentally to another.
Generally in order for proprietary rights to arise, formalities are required (except in the case of a lease less than 3 years)
Certainty of interests in law through formalities means flexibility and fairness is often sacrificed.
If one claims they have a right in land without formalities, despite how unfair it is, the rights will not be allowed.
Proprietary estoppel grew to mitigate the strictness and issues arising from this reliance on formalities.

Wilmott v Barber: The owner of the land could only be prevented from asserting his legal title if he acquiesces when a mistake is made by the claimants in relation to the land. 5 Probanda/ 5 essential characteristics of proprietary estoppel.

Taylor Fashions: Claim relating to unconscionably and constructive trusts. Constructive trusts had become limited, proprietary estoppel became a "substitute" for this.

Claimant must show there was an assurance by land owner which gave rise to the expectation that he/she had an interest in the land
There must be reliance upon the assurance
They must have acted to their detriment upon reliance of the assurance.

Gillett v Holt: Each requirement relies upon one another if proprietary estoppel is to be found. The whole matter is to be considered i.e. the holistic approach.

Assurance:
Acted on the basis that there was an interest in the land, not merely an action through mistake.
The assurance is the "bridge" between the expectation in land and actions of the owner.

Re Bashum: A has acted to his detriment on a belief known or encouraged by B.

Active Assurance:
words or conduct leads the Claimant to believe they have some interest in the land.
Pascoe v Turner: Claimed house is "yours and everything in it". This sufficiently amounts to active assurance.

Yeoman v Cobbe: Cobbe had agreed with Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (YRML) that he would get planning permission for the development of a property owned by YRML. When that had been achieved the property would be transferred to him. He would carry out the development works and the profits from the sale of the property would be shared between them according to a profit-sharing formula. No written contract existed but the parties had agreed on many of the essential terms. Cobbe knew that there was no legal commitment until contracts had been exchanged. HoL rejected the award of a proprietary remedy. The claimant must have an expectation of a ‘certain interest in land.’ Mr Cobbe did not satisfy this since he was fully aware that there was no binding contract. "proprietary estoppel can only act as a shield and not as a sword”. Even if there had been a concluded oral agreement, there was no reason why Yeoman should be estopped from arguing that it was not enforceable because it was not in writing. There must be a confident expectation that one has an interest in the land. Both parties here knew that the argument was not binding.

The assurance must be clear and unequivocal- this appears to be contradictory.

Thorner v Major: Thorner worked without pay on the farm owned by his father’s cousin. It was found as a fact that he had given assurances to David that he would inherit the farm. These assurances were in very vague terms but it was found as a fact that in the context of the personalities and relationship involved they were clear enough and had been understood and relied on. Peter died without leaving a will. ‘It was enough that the meaning he conveyed would reasonably have been understood as intended to be taken seriously as an assurance which could be relied upon.’ The assurance must be ‘clear enough’ but it did not have to be clear, precise and unambiguous (especially when the assurance is oral or to be implied from behaviour). Thorner has made it easier to establish that assurances had been made in a family context, where precise words are not used. It is enough for a general assurance to be made about the future of the land. Assurance must be considered from the whole context and so may arise orally, from conduct or from a written instrument

Thorner also claims it is “sufficient if the claimant reasonably relies on the assurance, even if the landowner did not intend that he should so rely”. Here, proprietary estoppel was used as a sword (it generated new rights) as opposed to a shield.

Ramsden v Dyson: Passive acquiescence to the claimant's act may give rise to passive assurance.

Once assurance is given, generally it cannot be revoked.

Taylor v Dickens: Old lady changed mind of leaving house to gardener but later changed her mind. This assurance could not give rise to estoppel as she had not encouraged the belief that she would not change her Will.

Gillett v Holt: Taylor v Dickens was too harsh. The revocable characteristic of a Will does not mean an assurance can be revoked. An assurance is essentially a promise.

Reliance:
Where a representation has been made and the claimant has acted to his detriment, there is a presumption that reliance exists.

Coombes v Smith: Coombes and Smith were having an affair and he bought a house for them. He later said that she and their daughter could only live there until her daughter was 17. Held, the decision to leave her husband was not relied upon the land itself but rather the want to have a relationship with him. Therefore there was no real detriment based upon assurances of the land but rather .

Detriment:
Gillett v Holt: there has to be a change in position. Suffering financial damage may amount to detriment.

Pascoe v Turner: improving on decorating the house amounts to detriment.

Re Basham: non- financial personal damage may amount to a detriment. Does not have to be purely financial eg. looking after someone beyond "acts of normal love and affection".

Jennings v Rice: Jennings had worked for free for Rice even sleeping on the sofa in her home to look after her. Rive encouraged Jennings to believe that he would receive a substantial sum under the terms of her will. Despite this, she died without making a will. At first instance, J was originally awarded GBP 200,000. J appealed on the basis that the promises made to him had lead him reasonably to expect a more generous share of her estate. Upheld the original award. The aim of the award in a proprietary estoppel case is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result. The size of the award depends on all of the circumstances including the expectation that has been encouraged and the detriment that has been suffered. Regard has to be had to the proportion between the expectation and the damage.

Satisfying the Estoppel:
Plimmer: There must be satisfaction of the Estoppel by the award of a remedy depending on the facts of the case.

Gillet v Holt: satisfaction of Estoppel was done by conveying the Freehold.

Grant v Williams: a grant of a lease (or share of ownership) may amount to satisfaction of the Estoppel.

Dodsworth: Compensation is only awarded in cases where there are no other damages available.

Appleby v Cowley: in some cases there may be no remedy.

Griffiths: the court has discretion as to how the remedy should be applied. The satisfaction must be just and fair.

Jennings v Rice: The aim of the award in a proprietary estoppel case is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result. The size of the award depends on all of the circumstances including the expectation that has been encouraged and the detriment that has been suffered. Regard has to be had to the PROPORTION between the expectation and damage when awarding satisfaction.

Priority:
LRA 2002 s116: equity in estoppel has effect from where the equity arises. It is capable of binding successors subject to the rules of priority.
An Estoppel Equity will not get priority over pre-registered interest as it is not a registered disposition.

LRA 2002 s29: a registered disposition (freehold or lease more than 7 years) will take priority over an equitable estoppel unless it is protected

An equitable interest is protected either as a notice under the register or under SCHEDULE 3 as ACTUAL OCCUPATION.

Estoppel licences:
Occupational licences are created through the process of Estoppel in order to satisfy the estoppel equity. It can generally not be revoked.
LRA 2002 s116: once the court had awarded an estoppel licence as a remedy, the licence cannot be binding upon a third-party purchaser.

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LLB Land (5. Licences and Proprietary Estoppel) Notiz am Licences and Proprietary Estoppel, erstellt von cadhla_corrigan am 20/05/2014.

Licences and Proprietary Estoppel