2777869
| Frage | Antworten |
| What is odd about Tolstoy's assumption that if he is unhappy and unlikely ever to be happy again he might as well kill himself? | * Implicit in this is the idea that meaning in life lies solely in hedonic egoism. * In The Experience Machine, Robert Nozick argues that nobody would want to plug themselves into a computer for life that merely gives them the experiences they desire - There is more to life than this. * Tolstoy also ignores the pleasure/pain of others, like his wife and children to whom he does not make reference. |
| Why, according to Tolstoy, is ""rational knowledge" unable to provide an answer to his question about the meaning of life? | * Rational knowledge is unable to bridge the gap between the finite (i.e. the domain our limited lives), and the infinite (the questions of "why?" and the lack of meaning). * There is a category error between descriptive statements (relating to fact) and normative statements (relating to opinions or values). |
| Life might be "meaningless" in two different ways. Explain. | * Albert Camus distinguishes between "meaning" in a cosmic sense, and "meaning" in terms of worth or value in life. Life may be meaningless in the cosmic sense, but this doesn't mean we can't having meaningful lives at our own level. * Tolstoy does not distinguish between the two, and thus Camus argues he is guilty of an equivocation, where a word is not used in the same way throughout an argument. |
| Camus "cannot conceive that a sceptical metaphysics can be joined to an ethics of renunciation." What does he mean by this, and why does he think so? | * By sceptical metaphysics, Camus refers to the philosophical outlook that there is no God, transcendental values or cosmic purpose, and by ethics of renunciation he refers to the idea that we ought to commit suicide. * Thus, Camus believes that rejecting the idea of God is not to say that our lives are meaningless and we should commit suicide. "Revolt" allows us to live in defiance of this lack of cosmic meaning. |
| What gives rise to the Absurd, according to Nagel? | * This occurs due to "a conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and reality." Nagel gives examples including professing your love over the telephone to a recorded announcement, or putting a criminal in charge of a philanthropic organisation. * In life this can come from a clash between subjective and objective perspectives - in the former we treat our lives with great seriousness, but if we "step back" to the latter, we can see this seriousness is gratuitous. |
| Nagel identifies a conflict between the value our lives seem to have from the subjective perspective and from the objective perspective. What three different ways of resolving this conflict does he consider? Does he think that any succeeds? | * We can take the objective as authoritative and mould the subjective in accordance with it (much like nirvana in Buddhism). * We can take the subjective as authoritative and mould the objective in accordance with it. * We could reject the conflict altogether. * Nagel disagrees with all three - absurdity is inevitable and unsolvable. |
| What, according to Frankfurt, is the relation between concern and importance? | * For Frankfurt, if I care about something, it must necessarily be important. * There are three aspects to this care for something, the cognitive (I am cognitively sensitive to it), the affective (I am emotionally sensitive to it), and the volitional (I want to promote it and oppose its diminsihment). |
| Wolfs says that meaningful activity "occurs where subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness." What does she mean? | * Meaningful activity is something that we want to do (e.g. follow your dreams), but also something that is objectively worthwhile. * We may have a passion for Sudoku, but partaking in it is almost futile - it achieves nothing, and is thus not meaningful. Similarly, a doctor may work hard and positively affect other's lives, but if they are not passionate about it, we cannot say that this is a meaningful, fulfilling activity. |
| What is natural evil? | * Evil for which no free agent is responsible, such as earthquakes, landslides, drought, etc. * Often contrasted with moral evil, a morally negative event which is the result of a free action on the part of an agent, like murder. |
| Explain the distinction between a deductive argument and an inductive argument. | A deductive argument is one in which the premises guarantee the conclusion. Contrastingly, an inductive argument essentially makes a weaker claim, that the premises provide support for the conclusion, but do not guarantee it. |
| What is gratuitous evil? | Evil which is not logically necessary for the existence of some greater good. For example we may say that the torture and rape of a child is gratuitous as it is wholly without justification. |
| What is Occam's razor? | * Also called the law of parsimony, this states that the simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable/most likely, all being equal. * For example, an explanation for an unknown phenomena should first be attempted in terms of what we already know - we should explain evil by arguing that it has no reason, rather than introducing the concept of a God who allows evil for reasons beyond our ken. |
| Define and explain the Divine Command Theory's (DCT) Theory of the Right | * The DCT Theory of the Right states that right and wrong is ultimately determined by God's commands. * An act is obligatory if and only if, and because, God commands it. An act is wrong if and only if, and because God forbids it. An act is morally optional if God neither commands nor forbids it. * The "because" is key - an act is wrong if God forbids it, but its wrongness originates from the fact that God says it's wrong. |
| Define and explain the Existential Equivalence Thesis | * All and only obligatory acts are commanded by God, and all and only wrong acts are forbidden by God. * So, if I were to write a list of things which are wrong, this would match those acts which are forbidden by God - i.e. the class of acts that are right are coextensive with a class of acts that are commanded by God. |
| Define and explain the Euthyphro Dilemma | * This appears in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro: Socrates asks whether the good is such because it is good (i.e. good is good because it is), or because the Gods say that it is good. * Both options are problematic: If the good simply is good, then it is independent of God's will and calls into question his omnipotence. If it is good because the God's say so, then it becomes arbitrary. |
| Define and explain the distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure | * A criterion of rightness gives an account of the properties that make an action right. A decision procedure gives the rules/practical method which tell us how to make a right decision. * A criterion of rightness could be that which maximises happiness, as in utilitarianism. A decision procedure would thus be the method for working out the amount of happiness that results from an action, like the hedonic calculus. |
| Explain the distinction between moral relativism and moral objectivism | * Moral relativism: What's right and wrong for a person to do is ultimately determined by the fundamental (i.e. basic) moral norms of his/her culture, e.g. female genital mutilation may be wrong in the UK, but right in some African cultures. Moral objectivism: there exist universal moral norms that are binding on all persons across all times, regardless of the culture where they belong. |
| Explain the distinction between a fundamental moral norm and a derivative moral norm | * X is a fundamental moral norm just in case X is a moral standard that doesn't derive from any more fundamental moral standard - i.e. it cannot be simplified. E.g. DCT takes "it is wrong to act as God forbids" as a fundamental moral norm. * X is a derivative moral norm if it can be simplified and derived from a fundamental moral norm. E.g. "do not steal" may be derived from "do not act as God forbids." |
| Explain the distinction between moral absolutism and moral non-absolutism | * Moral absolutism is the view that certain types of acts are wrong no matter the consequences, for example Kant believed we shouldn't lie to a murderer even if it would save lives. * Moral non-absolutism is the opposite, and thus right and wrong is not intrinsic to the action but depends on the consequences. Here, whether lying is wrong depends on whether the consequences are valuable, and in cases lying may be acceptable. |
| Can the moral relativist accept the claim that, in a given culture, certain fundamental moral norms have changed for the better? | * No - the relativist can only say that moral norms have changed. They cannot account for moral progress in this sense. * Given that morality derives from culture at a given time, the relativist can only account for progress in the sense that compliance with cultural norms increases. * Contrastingly, the objectivist can account for progress and say that moral norms have moved closer to the objectively correct set of norms. |
| What is the Moral Diversity Thesis? | * Moral Diversity Thesis (MDT) states that people in different societies accept different fundamental moral norms (a.k.a basic moral norms) - given that people in different societies make different moral judgements regarding the same type of action, they must differ in their fundamental norms. * MDT is a claim about what people believe to be true, and thus differs from moral relativism which is a claim about what is true. |
| Explain the problem of formulation that moral relativism faces | * Moral relativism states that right and wrong depends on the culture to which we belong - but we belong to many different cultures, so which one determines the moral status of our actions? * For example, Catholicism teaches that abortion is wrong, but a practicing catholic could belong to a liberal political party which supports pro-choice. * Unless the relativist can define which culture we take our morals from, the theory appears indeterminate. |
| Explain the moral reformer problem that moral relativism faces | * Under moral relativism, moral reformers such as MLK or Gandhi are making false statements. * For example when MLK claimed it was wrong to segregate on the basis of race, he was making a claim against the accepted norms of the time, but because morality depends on these norms, this statement is false under relativism. * For most this is counter-intuitive - it is indeed wrong to segregate based on race. |
| Does moral relativism entail that we should be tolerant of those in different societies? | * No. The statement that we should be tolerant of different societies is a claim of moral objectivism, i.e. a universal principle. * Whether it is morally wrong for one culture to interfere with another depends on the moral code of that culture. For example, I could be part of a culture that says it is right to dominate over other cultures - the opposite of tolerance. |
| Explain the distinction between determinism and indeterminsim | * Determinism is the view that every event, including people's choices and actions are completely determined by the past state of the world and the laws of nature, such that they necessarily occur given these antecedent conditions. So, given absolute knowledge, every event could be predicted with absolute certainty. * Indeterminism is the opposite of this - not every even is determined/predicatable. |
| Explain the distinction between determinism and fatalism | * Determinism is the view that every event, including people’s choices and actions, are completely determined by the past state of the world and the laws of nature, such that they necessarily occur given those antecedent conditions - every "choice" I make is thus completely predictable. * Under fatalism, nobody could predict the choices I make, but ultimately whatever choices I do make will lead to the same outcome - think Final Destination - I can't avoid my fate no matter what. |
| Explain the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism | * Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with free will - an act is free if and only if the agent could have done other than A had her act-determining psychological states been different. * Conversely incompatibilism state that the truth of determinism rules out the kind of free will that entails moral responsibility. An act is free if and only if the agent could have done otherwise under identical conditions. |
| What is a verbal dispute? | * A verbal dispute occurs over the ambiguities in language that people use to express their opinions. * Stace gives the example of someone defining a man as a 5 legged animal - a verbal dispute would then arise over whether men exist. * Once the definitions of the subject matter have been agreed upon, there is no longer such a verbal dispute. |
| What is the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP)? | * PAP states that a agent is morally responsible for what he/she has done only if they could have done otherwise - it is often used by advocates of determinism to show that this rules out free will. * E.g. I may choose to kill X, but in fact this choice was determined and I could not have done otherwise. PAP state that I am not morally responsible for the killing. |
| Explain Frankfurt's Jones(4) case. What does he think it shows? | * Dr Black wants Jones(4) to kill Smith, and secretly implants a chip in Jones' brain to control what he does. If Jones shows a sign that he won't kill Smith, Dr Black intervenes, and if not Jones kills Smith entirely of his own volition. * Frankfurt believes this is a counterexample to the PAP: Jones(4) can be responsible for killing Smith because he wanted to, but Dr Black removes the possibility that he could do otherwise. |
| Explain Frankfurt's distinction between first-order desires and the will | * A first order desire is a desire to act in a certain way, for example A wants to read a book. The will is the first order desire that it (or will be) causally efficacious. * At any one time, we may have many first-order desires - read a book, watch a film, sleep, etc. If I end up reading, then my will is to read the book, as this was my first-order desire that moved me to act. |
| Explain Frankfurt's distinction between second-order desires and second-order volitions | * A second-order desire is a desire for a certain first order desire. However one may not want this first-order desire to be causally efficacious. For example, a doctor may want the inclination to take heroin (to empathise with his patients), but to have the first order desire not to take it. * A second-order volition occurs when one wants a first order desire to be one's will (i.e. they want the first-order desire to be causally efficacious. |
| What is Agrippa's trilemma? What is it supposed to show? | * The trilemma is such that when justifying our beliefs, either (1) the process of justification will go on infinitely (regress), (2) we'll have to stop somewhere, but at an arbitrary point (dogmatism), or (3) we'll argue circularly. * This is supposed to show the apparent impossibility of proving any truths, leading to a position of scepticism. |
| How do rationalist and empiricist versions of foundationalism differ? | * Rationalist foundationalism holds that foundations (i.e. non-inferentially justified beliefs) can be found effectively through armchair reflection - they are discoverable though reason, like a priori truths. * Empiricist foundationalism argues that the foundations of knowledge don't come from the head, but from how the world impacts upon the senses. We discover foundations by looking at the world empirically. |
| What is the 'Myth of the Given'? Why is it said to be a myth? | * This is a rejection of empiricist foundationalism. The given - those mental states which justify our beliefs without the need for justification themselves - is a myth as it is once removed from reality. * Either the given is propositional, and thus cannot put us in direct contact with reality (which is not propositional), or it is non-propositional, in which case it cannot stand in a valid logical relation to our beliefs to justify them. Neither possibility holds. |
| Explain the 'conspiracy theorist' objection to coherentism | * This objection argues that the mere fact that beliefs cohere is not sufficient for their truth. * A conspiracy theorist may say that CCTV exists for the government to spy on us. One could counter that it is for our own safety, but the theorist could respond that this is merely what we're supposed to think. * Both accounts cohere and so are more likely to be true under coherentism, but this is illogical. |
| What is the difference between internalist and externalist theories of justification? | * Internalist theories of justification hold that justification is "internal" to us, accessible through introspection. Foundationalism and coherentism are examples of this theory - if I am justified in believing p, I know what my justification is. * Externalist theories hold that justification is "external" to is, and need not be accessible through internal reflection. I may be justified in believing p even if I don't know my justification. |
| What do process reliabilists hold about justification? | * Justification is a kind of process, so justified belief depends on the reliability of the process(es) that cause it. * E.g. palm reading forms both true and false beliefs - it is an unreliable process and thus cannot form justified beliefs. However, perception of sensory stimulus can lead to justified beliefs as it is a generally reliable process. * We don't need to know if the processes are reliable - they just need to be reliable processes. |
| What is the 'new evil demon' objection to reliabilism? | * The objection posits an exact epistemic counterpart to ourselves - someone who has been through exactly the same mental states since birth. But, this counterpart has been deceived, and is in fact merely a brain in a vat (or similar). * It seems that we are justified in our perceptual beliefs to the same extent as our counterpart, but our experiences are much more reliable. This shows that justification is not reliability, as reliabilism suggests. |
| What is the 'bootstrapping', or 'easy knowledge' objection to reliabilism? | * The objection is that knowledge gained from reliabilism is too easy - like lifting yourself up by your bootstraps. * For example, I check my watch for the time, but I don't know if it is reliable. But given that it is reliable, according to reliabilism I can form justified beliefs. I can then use the reliable method of inductive inference, based on these justified beliefs, to deduce that my watch is reliable - this is too easy. |
| What is the difference between reductionism and non-reductionism (ie. anti-reductionism) about testimony? | * In reductionism testimony is no different to other ways of acquiring knowledge - it can be reduced to alternative methods like perception and deduction. Thus, testimony cannot be taken at "face value" and we have no a priori reasons to believe it. * In anti-reductionsim, testimony is a sui generis (unique) way of acquiring knowledge. We have a priori (but defeasible) reasons to believe testimony, and should only doubt it if we have evidence that someone is unreliable. |
| What was Hume's view of testimony? | * Hume believed that knowledge is acquired through testimony through observation. We don't believe testimony through a priori means, but because we tend to find conformity between testimony and reality - i.e. it is generally reliable to believe people's testimony. * For Hume, testimony is one of the most important forms of reasoning, but is not a special form of knowledge. |
| What is Fricker's argument against non-reductionism? | * Fricker identifies a deductive argument in favour of non-reductionism, and the negative claim made in favour of it. This states that evidence of a testifier's reliability is not generally available. * Fricker argues we can look at the testifier's reputation, or the fact that most people are reliable on certain subjects, for example, as evidence of reliability. Taking testimony on trust could have disastrous consequences, and evidence is vital for testimonial knowledge. |
| What is the difference between global and local reductionism about testimony? | * Global and local reductionism both reduce our justification in knowledge gained from testimony to independent observation and inference. * However global reductionism requires that to accept a testimony, one must consider many other cases of testimony, and compare these with the facts to see if testimony is generally reliable. * Local reductionism only requires that there be evidence that a particular testimony/testifier can be trusted, rather than testimony in general. We must consider things like that particular testifier’s trustworthiness, which can include information gained from previous testimony. |
| Explain the two types of epistemic injustice | * Hermeneutical injustice occurs when persons or groups are unable to participate in the formualation and construction of meaning - Fricker given the example of a woman in the '50s unable to cite sexual harassment, as this was not an understood term. * Testimonial injustice occurs when a person is unable to disseminate knowledge through testimony due to a credibility deficit. For example, children may not be believed if they accuse adults of sexual harassment. |
| Explain Fricker's perceptual theory of testimony | * Fricker begins by rejecting reductionism, as this doesn't match our own experience of testimony, and non-reductionism which suggests knowledge can only be required when our cognitive capacities are switched off. * Instead, Fricker suggests that through adult's inherent critical and conceptual capacities, we perceive testifiers as reliable/not-reliable in perceiving their testimony. |
| What is identity power? | * Identity power concerns operations of power dependent on agents having shared conceptions of social identity, like man vs. woman, or gay vs. straight. * This may be exercised actively, such as when a man uses his identity as a man (possibly unintentionally) to silence a woman, or passible such as when a women is already silenced by virtue of her gender. |
| What is testimonial justice, and how can it be acquired? | * Fricker argues testimonial justice is a virtue displayed when a person sees the world in the right kind of way. They are able to perceive a testifier in a way that does not do them epistemic injustice, making this a perceptual virtue. * This can be learned by developing a critical awareness, or critical openness, allowing us to see things differently and question our own biases. |
| What is an epistemic peer? | * Conee defines epistemic peers as individuals who have a shared basis and capacity for reasonable beliefs concerning a proposition, i.e. each is equally qualified in a particular area. * For example, my epistemic peer may be another philosophy student - a professor's peer could be another professor in the same field. |
| Explain Richard Feldman's Uniqueness Thesis | * Feldman's thesis states that a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of propositions, and justifies at most one attitude towards any particular proposition. * So, in the case of any (facutal) disagreement, there is only one right answer, one justified answer, and one answer which is responsive to the evidence. * For example two detectives with the same body of evidence cannot conclude a suspect is guilty and not guilty respectively. |
| What is Earl Conee's argument against the Uniqueness Thesis? | * Conee's response stems from his principle RE - reason from rationality: If S is rational in believing it is rational for her to believe p, S has a reason to believe p. * He gives the example of two epistemic peers, Smith and Jones. Both believe it rational to believe one's intuitions, and since Smith has an intuition in favour of a principle which Jones does not, Smith can rationally believe the principle whereas Jones cannot. |
| Explain Richard Feldman's 'modest scepticism' | * Feldman argues that in the case of irresolvalbe disagreement between two equally reasonable and knowledgeable parties (between epistemic peers), one ought to withhold judgement, as we have no basis for taking one view over the other. * This is a modest view as it only argues compromise in the case of genuine irresolvable disagreement, while it is sceptical as it denies the existence of reasonable beliefs in a large number of cases. |
| What is epistemic relativism? | * Epistemic relativism is the position that there are no epistemic truths, rather epistemic truths are merely relative to a justificatory system. * So, a proposition like "E justifies in belief B" should not merely mean E justifies B, but that "according to the epistemic system C, which I support, E justifies belief B." |
| Explain Paul Boghossian's argument in favour of relativism | * Boghossian forms a deductive arument: If there are epistemic facts about what justifies what, it ought to be possible to arrive at justified beliefs about them, yet it is not possible to arrive at justified beliefs about what absolute facts there are. * Quoting Wittgenstien, where two principles cannot be reconciled "each man declares the other a fool and a heretic." There cannot be any epistemic facts, and thus relativism must be true. |
| Explain the 'traditional refutation' of relativism | * This states that either epistemic relativism is objectively justified, or it is justified relative to an epistemic system. * If relativism is objectively justified, then epistemic relativism is false, as it is the view that nothing can be objectively justified. And, if it is justified relative to an epistemic system, then while compellling, it is only justified for the relativist. |
| Explain Paul Boghossian's argument against relativism | * Boghossian argues that if relativism is true, all epistemic frameworks are false, i.e. Any epistemic proposition must be relativised by adding "according to justificatory framework X." * If particular epistemic propositions are false, then so are more general ones, but epistemic systems are merely collections of general epistemic propositions. * Given belief cannot be justified relative to a false framework, then no belief is justified relative to an epistemic framework. |
| Explain the difference between a logical possibility and a logical impossibility | * Something is logically possible just in so far as it does not involve a conceptual contradiction, that is one could conceive of that something being true. * Logical impossibility is the opposite of this and involves a conceptual contradiction, for example a square circle or 2+2=5. |
| Explain the paradox of omnipotence and its solution | * The paradox of omnipotence rests around such question as, "Can God create a stone so heavy he cannot lift it?" If God created such a stone then he would no longer be omnipotent, yet omnipotence implies the possibility to do anything, wherein lies the paradox. * A solution could be to define omnipotence as the ability to do anything that is logically possible. Hence, to say God could create such a stone would be a meaningless statement. |
| What is a theodicy? What is its general structure? | * A theodicy is a defence of evil in the face of the "three O" God - one who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. * The typical structure involves suggesting some greater good, G, such that G's co-existence with no evil is logically impossible, and that its existence is better with even with evil, rather than to instead have no evil at all. |
| Explain the distinction between the theodicist and the anti-theodicist. Can an atheist be a theodicist? | * A theodicist is one who believes, and may argue the case that, the "three O" god is compatible with the existence of evil. The anti-theodicist believes that the two are incompatible. * An atheist may still be a theodicist, for while they may believe evil and the three O God are compatible, they may reject God's existence on other grounds. |
| Give two objections to the logical account of a good argument | * One objection is that it can rule out the possibility of inductive arguments, which form the basis of much of our beliefs. To say the sun will rise tomorrow as it rose yesterday, and the day before, etc. is a bad argument on this account, showing the conditions are not necessary. * Secondly the logical account permits circular arguments, like P therefore P. This shows the conditions are not sufficient. |
| Give two objections to the persuasion account of a good argument | * Firstly, the account is not sufficient as it permits coercive arguments, or persuasion through the use of drugs for example, clearly neither of which are good arguments. * Secondly the account is not necessary as while a person may put forward a good argument, the hearer could be obstinate and refuse to believe it. Surely this is still a good argument? |
| What is the 'ideal conditions' account of a good argument? | * This account states that an argument is good if, and only if, it would persuade a community of ideal interlocutors. These would need to be knowledgeable, reflective (e.g. not drugged), open, and dialectically astute. * This avoids the challenge that the persuasion account permits coercive arguments for example - the ideal conditions would not be satisfied here. |
| What is a good argument, according to Alvin Goldman? | * Goldman provides a verific account of good argumentation, that is, a good argument is one that promotes truth, and avoids error. * Goldman provides a list of rules and conditions that ought to be satisfied in order to promote this goal, for example the speaker should assert a conclusion only if she believes it, and the more persuasive an argument, the better. |
| Explain one of Goldman's objections to the view that justification is "a fundamentally social affair" | * Goldman presents 5 arguments against a certain interpretation of this, that is, person S is justified in believing proposition Y if and only if there are arguments S can present to his/her peers that would persuade them of Y. * One point is that the condition is insufficient: S could be an amazing rhetorician and use a fallacy to persuade his/her peers. But S would surely not be justified on the basis of this fallacy. |
| What is epistemic conrtextualism? | * This is the view that justification depends on dialectical context. For example, Amy meets with her manager, and knowing her well, he justifiably believes her companion is not an impostor. But if the dialectical context changed and the police arrive to arrest Amy for impersonation, the belief would no longer be justified. * The change in context provides well-motivated challengers to the manager's beliefs, idle before the arrival of police, explaining the intuitive difference. |
| Explain Annis's idea of a "well-motivated challenge" | * For Annis, well-motivated challenges are made in the spirit of collective iinquiry, that is, objectors must be "verifically motivated" - directed by the aim of searching for truth, and avoiding error. * When such challenges arise, we need to address them in order to remain justified in our beliefs - for Annis, justification is possible if and only if we can meet well-motivated challenges to our beliefs. |
| Why doesn't Annis think we need justification for all our beliefs? | * Under Annis's definition of justification, we are justified if and only if we can meet well-motivated challenges to our beliefs. Yet under certain circumstances, these challenges simply don't exist, and thus we don't need justification for our beliefs. * For example beliefs like "I caught the train this morning," or "that car looks red to me." |
| Outline Anthony Quinton's summativist view of group belief | As a summaativist, Quinton argues that groups cannot (literally) have knowledge or justified belief. For Quinton, while we may often apply epistemic predicates to groups in everyday speech, we are merely speaking metaphorically, and are indirectly ascribing mental predicates to the group's members. |
| What is a "divergence argument"? Give an example | * A divergence argument points to a situation where the identity of the group, and the identity of its members diverge - normally where the identity of the members changes, but the group remains constant. * For example, a member of the government could resign, and the identity of its members thus changes. But the identity of the government is the same - "government" still refers to the same thing. |
| Explain Gilbert's argument for strong psychological non-summativism | * Gilbert provides a divergence argument against the "simple summative account" of group belief, that a group believes p if and only if all or most members believe p. * The group may believe p even if all or most members don't, or vice-versa. Instead she suggests a group believes p if and only if its members are jointly committed as a body to believe p. * For example, a group may compromise on individual beliefs, creating a separate belief. |
| What is strong epistemological non-summativism? | * This is the view that the epistemic status of a group does not directly depend on the epistemic status of its members - groups can justifiably believe a proposition even if none of its members can, or all members may justifiably believe a proposition even if the group can't. * For example, a group may compromise on individual beliefs, creating a separate belief. |
| Explain, using an example, the discursive dilemma | * This is a paradox such that aggregating votes using majority voting can result in self-contradictory judgements. * For example, a three member panel must decide if an applicant meets grade, statement, and interview requirements, all of which must be met. Individually, each believes that applicant has satisfies only 2 requirements, rejecting admission, as each criteria gets two "yes" votes, all requirements are satisfied under group voting, contradicting the individual beliefs. |
| What is the difference between the premise-based, and conclusion-based approach? | * The conclusion-based approach focuses on each individuals's overall beliefs when using majority voting, not the individual reasons/criteria which make up these beliefs. * Under the premise-driven approach, the group stance is taken on member's beliefs on individual premises. Here, even though most of a group vote against a motion, it could still be implemented. |
| What is List and Pettit's Impossibility Theorem? | * The theorem arises when trying to solve the discursive dilemma. Essentially, this is impossible to achieve without sacrificing some element of either democracy (universal domain, anonymity, systematicity), or rationality (completeness, consistency, deductive closure). * Groups can support the rules of rationality only "to the extent that they are responsive to the views of their members." |
| Explain one objection to the premise-based approach | * The main objection is that this lead to a group conclusion which all members reject. * Pettit gives the example of employees voting on a pay cut - while everyone disagrees that the cut should be implemented, each individual premise is supported by a majority. So, under the premise-driven approach, the whole group accepts a cut, counter the individual views. |
Möchten Sie mit GoConqr kostenlos Ihre eigenen Karteikarten erstellen? Mehr erfahren.