3640621
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Karteikarten von sharon dolon, aktualisiert more than 1 year ago
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Erstellt von sharon dolon
vor etwa 9 Jahre
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| Frage | Antworten |
| No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. | |
| Ruling: At the very least,their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient,but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. [t]he inescapable conclusion that the donation made [i]s void under Art.87 of the Family Code. | |
| Ruling: Subject property is paraphernal. [a]mount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the amount paid by Her husband through monthly salary deductions. Subject property is an equitable mortgage. (1)respondents remained in possession as lessee . . . (2)petitioner retained part of "purchased price". . . (3)respondents paid real property taxes . . .(4)She secured payment of principal debt. . . | |
| Ayala Investments v. CA | Ruling: Art. 121 (3) of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by husband and wife or during the marriage shall not be charged to the CP except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. [t]he loan is corporate not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of family. |
| Ching v. CA | The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the company, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. |
| Francisco v. Gonzales | (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. It creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. |
| Buado v. Nicol | The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. [n]o stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. |
| Pana v. Heirs of Juanite | Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered.” No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.” |
| BA Finance v. CA | [t]he obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by her husband for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home |
| Heirs of Ayuste v. CA | A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. |
| Heirs of Reyes v. Mijares | Ruling: [l]ot is a conjugal property having been purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of his wife is voidable. Her action to annul the sale which was filed before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. |
| Pelayo v. Perez | Ruling: As long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. If she affixed her signature as a witness, her consent was deemed to have been given impliedly, especially is she is fully aware of the sale. The lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. |
| Aguete v. PNB | Ruling:If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. |
| Homeowners Savings Bank v. Dailo | The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. |
| Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa | Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property , that other spouses' written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. |
| Guiang v. CA | The disposition or encumbrance is void. [t]he husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance |
| Ayala Investments v. CA | When the husband contracts an obligation to guarantee the debt of. A third party, the contract is clearly for the benefit of the third party, not the family. [n]o presumption can be inferred that the guarantee is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself such as the prospects of a longer employment. |
| Buenaventura v. CA | If a marriage is declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity, the properties should be owned in the concept of co-ownership. This is to over emphasize the rule that a void marriage , regardless of its ground cannot be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute community of property regime. |
| Ferrer v. Ferrer | The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner -spouse. |
| Abing v. Waeyan | Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares in the absence of proof to the contrary. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. An under this regime,they owned their properties in common "in equal shares". Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question , she may not be ejected therefrom. |
| Agapay v. Palang | [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, of industry shall be owned by them is common in proportion to their respective contributions. Actual contribution is required by Art.148 in contrast to Art. 147 FC which states that efforts in the care maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. |
| Ravina v. Villa Abrille | No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by the husband. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that Property acquired during the marriage of Spouses is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from a bank to construct the house. |
| Fuentes v. Roca | Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. |
| De Leon v. De leon | [I]n a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. |
| Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa | In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses over the subject property were validly transferred to respondent . Since the sale of the conjugal property by The husband was without the consent of his wife, the same is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that the wife failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from 2nd party to 3rd party and from the latter to daughter.Therefore, title to the subject property cannot anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches. The issues of prescription and laches having been resolved, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition. |
| Muller v. Muller | [T]he finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.It cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution . |
| Beumer v. Beumer | [P]etitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into. [T]he Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. |
| Maquilan v. Maquilan | [S]eparation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. |
| Valdes v. RTC | In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. |
| Metrobank v. Pascual | Termination of Conjugal Property Regime doesnot ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Spouses severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns. |
| Diño v. Diño | petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage |
| Salas Jr. v. Aguila | Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, He did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. |
| Venturan Jr. v. Abuda | [R]egistration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. |
| Tumlos v. Fernandez | As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. [t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage." Hence, petitioner’s argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively. |
| Mallilin Jr v. Castillo | The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. |
| Cariño v. Cariño | In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. |
| Saguid v. CA | As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence |
| Atienza v. De Castro | True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner's evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court's finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioner's dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. |
| Borromeo v. Descallar | [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase [o]f the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. |
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