Theory of mind

Annotations:

• Believe action means an emotion - will understand if someone else is doing that action - such representations of others' actions may constitute a rudimentary ToM (understanding of why others do certain things)

1. Observe another's action
   1. Motor commands for producing oneself
      1. Intentions that drie that action in us
         1. Same intention drives action in another
2. Protodeclaritive pointing: 9-14m

   Annotations:

   • Use point to explain and help others understand what they're talking or thinking about (Bates et al, 1979)
   1. Shared gaze: 12m

      Annotations:

      • Infants sensitive to where another person is looking and understand significance of the eyes (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002) - know that where people look is to do with the meaning of the conversation - gaze --> see if they have ToM even when can't articulate
      1. Joint attention: 14m

         Annotations:

         • Infants keen to establish joint attention
         1. Concern for others: 18m

            Annotations:

            • Show concern at distress of others (see distress in selves when someone else is distressed)

Annotations:

• - what another may be thinking/feeling - enables us to explain and predict the behaviours of others (how differs from own knowledge and may affect their behaviour)

1. Empathising

   Annotations:

   • ToM important component of empathising - cannot empathise if don't understand that people have different beliefs to one's own
2. appropriate affective reaction

   Annotations:

   • to others mental states - other main component)

Annotations:

• Premack & Woodruff, 1978

1. Seen in some primates

   Annotations:

   • Call & Tomasello, 2008) - review

1. Medial PFC

   Annotations:

   • Gallagher & Frith, 2003
2. Posterior superior sulcus

   Annotations:

   • Gallagher & Frith, 2003
3. right temporal parietal junction

   Annotations:

   • Saxe & Powell, 2006

Annotations:

• Understanding that others may have representations of the world that are false and/or different from one's own - understanding that others act on basis of their beliefs rather than reality - not expecting them to do what you would do

1. False belief tasks
   1. First order ToM
      1. Maxi task

         Annotations:

         • Wimmer & Perner (1983) Maxi and the chocolate - puts choc in box and goes out to play, mum moves choc ToM Q's Q: where will Maxi look for it? Q: where does Maxi think it is? Memory control Q's Q: where is it now? Q: where was it before? - story comprehension a problem
         1. 4-6 y/o

            Annotations:

            • 50% 4-5 y/o 92% 5-6 y/o - all got memory Q correct - false belief representation may develop between 4-6
      2. Sally-Anne task

         Annotations:

         • Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985) - Anne moves Sally's marble while she's out the room Q: where will Sally look for her marble - story comprehension a problem
         1. 4-5 y/o

            Annotations:

            • typically developing passed this task
      3. Smarties task

         Annotations:

         • Perner et al, 1987 - Smarties task solves problems of story comprehension - ask child what's inside, show it's actually crayons (not smarties) ToM Q: what would friend think is inside? Memory Q: what did you think was inside before you knew?
         1. 4-5 y/o
      4. Criticisms

         Annotations:

         • Bloom & German, 2000 - review of false belief tasks
         1. Too easy

            Annotations:

            • May not require full theory of mind - participants with ASD can sometimes pass these tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1989) - something else allowing them to perform otimally
   2. Second/higher-order ToM
      1. Ice cream story

         Annotations:

         • Perner & Wimmer, 1985 Both John and Mary know ice cream truck has moved, but neither know the other knows. Where will John think Mary will go to buy ice cream? - must understand John's ignorance of Mary's knowledge 
         1. 6-7 y/o

            Annotations:

            • Delay in development in first-order ToM understanding --> second-order ToM understanding
         2. Simplified
            1. 4-5 y/o

               Annotations:

               • Sullivan et al (1994) - over 90% of 4-5 y/o could succeed at second order ToM tasks if the stories were simplified
      2. Beliefs about beliefs
      3. language and comprehension

         Annotations:

         • Children's performance on second-order ToM tasks will still be inherently linked to their language and story comprehension abilities - therefore tasks are not good for assessing ToM in young children - too difficult

Annotations:

• Understanding of false belief develops earlier than 4, but traditional false belief tasks are too hard for younger children to pass and understand due to language, comprehension and memory abilities - require complex responses - requires child to remember details of the story- unable to pass

1. Non-verbal measures
   1. Eye-tracking

      Annotations:

      • Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005 - actor plays with toy and puts in yellow box, - infant (but not actor) sees toy moved to different box - actor reaches into a box
      1. 15 m/o

         Annotations:

         • Looked longer at box that adult couldn't have known it was moved to - shows they understood it wasn't normal and was surprising - suggests they understand that to some extent, people should act in accordance with their beliefs
2. Language learning

   Annotations:

   • Early evidence of ToM in infants' word-learning abilities - following gaze - parent names things while looking at them - infant follows gaze to associate word with object
   1. Better glaze following skills: 10 - 11m

      Annotations:

      • Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005 - infants who had better gaze-following skills at 10-11 months had higher language scores at 18m
      1. Higher language scores: 18m
   2. Baldwin (1991, 1993)

      Annotations:

      • Response to subsequent comprehension questions revealed infants: - successfully learned the labels introduced during follow-in labelling - displayed no tendency to make mapping errors after discrepant labelling
      1. LDG

         Annotations:

         • Listeners direction of gaze strategy to learn words - relies on some understanding of the intention of the speaker
         1. Follow in labelling

            Annotations:

            • Experimenter looked at and labelled toy that infants were already looking at
            1. 16-17m

               Annotations:

               • - successfully learned the labels introduced during follow-in labelling - understand that a speaker's nonverbal cues are relevant to the reference of object labels - they already can contribute to the social coordination involved in achieving joint reference
      2. SDG

         Annotations:

         • Speaker's direction of gaze strategy to learn words - relies on some understanding of the intention of the speaker
         1. Discrepant labelling

            Annotations:

            • Experimenter looked at and labelled different toy that one child was looking at
            1. 18-19m

               Annotations:

               • - displayed no tendency to make mapping errors after discrepant labelling

1. ASD

   Annotations:

   • Impaired ToM = One of the hallmarks of ASD - some theories propose ASD = ToM deficit
   1. Baron-Cohen

      Annotations:

      • Two theories proposed - but has since moved on from this theory too (these models do not account for all traits)
      1. Initial ToM model
      2. Empathising/systemising theory
   2. Often fail false-belief tasks

      Annotations:

      • But not always - read B-C's papers on false belief tasks
   3. Language imapirments

      Annotations:

      • Frequently have language impairments - thought to have links with ToM deficit (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997)

1. Questionnaire measures

   Annotations:

   • Variety of measures to assess ToM, mainly questionnaire based
   1. Interpersonal reactivity scale

      Annotations:

      • Davis, 1980 - empathy: reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another (Davis, 1983 - 28-items, 5-point likert scale of how well it describes them - 4 sub-scales (7 items each) 1) Perspective taking (ability to spontaneously adopt others' POV) 2) Fantasy (transpose selves imaginitvely into feels/actions of ficticious characters) 3) Empathic concern (Assesses 'other-orientated' feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others) 4) Personal distress ('self orientated' feelings of personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal settings)
   2. Empathy quotient

      Annotations:

      • Good validity (Lawrence et al, 2004) - 60 item questionnaire - developed by B-C 4 point Likert - strongly agree --> strongly disagree
2. 'Eyes' task

   Annotations:

   • Baron-Cohen et al, 1997, 2001 - rate emotion from eye expressions
3. Social attribution task

   Annotations:

   • Heider & Simmel, 1944 - attribution of mental states to the interaction of inanimate objects/shapes - thought to reflect higher-order ToM abilities - making sense if and explaining their behaviour - social attribution tasks to examine ToM in individuals with Asperger's and HF autism
   1. physical elements

      Annotations:

      • Abell, Happe & Frith (2000) - HF ASD , 8 y/o - used terms that attributed animacy to the shapes less often than TD children and used incorrect terms/emotions more often - less emotion/people based terms - describe physical elements - Abell, F., Happe, F., & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development.Cognitive Development, 15(1), 1-16
      • Klin & Jones (2006) - adults - those with HF ASD - impaired on social attribution task, but not on very similar physical attribution task - deficit is domain-specific (not simply general deficit in reasoning/attribution - specific to social stimuli)
   2. PET/neuroimaging studies

      Annotations:

      • brain activation when watching shapes move in social way vs. randomly - greater activation in superior temporal sulcus, TPJ and mPFC when watching social movements - TD show more activation in these areas than ASD - fMRI - FFA activation from social attribution