Hungarian protestors were encouraged by support
from Eisenhower and Dulles through Radio Free
Europe
They assumed that they would receive US
military assistance
In fact, West refused to stop the Red Army's brutal
suppression of the rising
Political and military realities meant that the
USA could not intervene to protect Hungary
Western reaction was restricted to strong
condemnation of the USSR and the U.S.
taking 25000 Hungarian refugees
Growing skepticism about the USSR's new mood of accommodation
govt knew that any direct Western involvement in
Hungary would almost certainly trigger nuclear war
Hungary revealed that, in practice, the USA could not 'roll
back' communism in East Europe
Containment remained only possible American policy
Eisenhower and Dulles take
charge
Victory for Eisenhower in 1952 seems to signal start of an
uncompromising American approach to superpower relations
E attacked Truman of being 'soft' on communism and
rejected containment as 'futile and immoral'
Prior to election, Dulles talked of 'rolling back' communism and
securing the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe from Soviet control
Once in office, E and D adopted the 'new look' policy, which
emphasised hard line Cold War diplomacy
Why did Eisenhower want better
relations with the USSR
In public, E stressed the new look policy, but in private he was prepared
to act pragmatically to improve relations with the USSR, he did this for
the following reasons:
Military background made him strongly aware of the dangers
of a nuclear conflict that could 'destroy civilisation'
Was concerned that military spending (12% of GNP in mid 50s) was too high and that
it threatened to affect living standards. Better relations with USSR would decrease
likelihood of nuclear war and therefore the govt could reduce military spending
U2's showed that USSR was considerably behind in arms race. E knew USSR could
not win nuclear war. Gave the US the upper hand in negotiations
Summary: New look went hand in hand with better relations because by strengthening
the USA's position, E hoped to force USSR to negotiate rather than risk war
Key Features of New Look policy
on the Cold War
Massive Retaliation
Jan 1954, Dulles announced 'Massive retaliatory power'
-that the USA would make greater use of nuclear threats
and place less reliance on conventional weaponry
Circumstances which the USA would use
'massive retaliation' were kept deliberately
vague to put opponents at a disadvantage
Brinkmanship
Massive retaliation formed part of Dulles' wider
policy of Brinkmanship
instances of US
brinkmanship
1953, US warned China that if Korean war was nor
brought to speedy conclusion, it would use nuclear
weapons - Armistice was signed shortly after
CCP shelling of Quemoy and Matsy in 1954-5, US
issue nuclear threats. Mao's forces stopped their
military action
Increased use of Covert
Operations - 1953 onwards
1953 CIA operation to ensure that the pro western Pahlavi
was installed as Shah of Iran. Success of the operation gave
US an ally on the USSR border
1954 CIA backed coup against the left wing
Guatemalan president Guzman
Development of U2 spy planes to aid intelligence gathering
Domino Theory
US policy influenced by E's domino theory April 1954
Theory stated that if Vietnam fell to communism, it would be followed
in turn by surrounding countries
These concerns prompted the setting up of SEATO - South East Asian Treaty Organisation
A military alliance between the USA and the countries of South East Asia
Eisenhower Doctrine 1957
Committed US economic and military support to protect
the independence of any state in the region which was
threatened by armed comm aggression
Was designed to halt communist penetration of the Middle
East and to stop the oil supplies there falling into hostile
hands