Philosophy of Mind - created from Mind Map

SUBSTANCE DUALISM FOR CRITICISMS LAW OF IDENTITY ARGUMENTS INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION ARGUMENT INITIAL OBJECTIONS THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM THE PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS Mind cannot be scientifically investigated Evolution Localisation (a) Interactionism (b) Parallelism (c) Epiphenomenalism Origins of the Problem The Cartesian Legacy Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument The Argument from Analogy Wittgenstein's criteriological response to the problem of other minds Problems with the argument from analogy

REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM LOGICAL BEHAVIOURISM MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY FUNCTIONALISM FOR CRITICISMS It doesn't face the problem of mental causation It avoids the problem of other minds Behaviourism is vague (problems with dispositions) Can we apply a behaviourist account to our own mental states? Behaviour is caused by mental states Qualia FOR CRITICISMS No nomological danglers The most economical explanation (satisfies Occam's Razor) Individual Differences The Identity is conceived too narrowly Irreducibility of consciousness (QUALIA) The conceivability argument CRITICISMS FOR The Problem of Qualia The Problem of Intentionality Inverted Qualia Absent Qualia Blockhead Example Searle's Chinese Room Argument Objections Dennett's Defence of Functionalism in response to Searle The Systems Objection The Robot Objection Searle's Response Improvement on other materialist theories Less species-chauvinist Closely linked to research programmes in relevant disciplines Research of computer scientists Research of cognitive scientists Research into biological teleology

NON-REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM Emergentism Supervenience PROPERTY DUALISM EPIPHENOMENALISM SEARLE'S BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM CRITICISMS The Traditional Terminology Objection to Searle's Micro/Macro Analogy Searle wants it both ways (materialist and dualist) Biological Naturatism is a form of property dualism Searle rejects reductive materialism Searle rejects any version of dualism Why I am Not a Property Dualist (2002) Causally reducible Ontologically irreducible Searle says conscious states are: Ontologically subjective Qualitative Have intentionality Have a spatial location explained through microphysical processes causally efficacious FOR CRITICISMS It simplifies our ontology Removes mind/body interaction body Eliminative Materialism is counter-intuitive Eliminative Materialism is self-refuting Is folk psychology as hopeless as eliminative materialism suggests? Nothing changes except terminology - Norman Malcolm Patricia Churchland's Response Many of the criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the theory Nothing is eliminated, rather EM is about the level of explanation She would rather call it Revisionary Materialism

Philosophy of Mind