2598009
| Pregunta | Respuesta |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Party Effects on Women MPs (Caul 1999) | * PR system => More women elected BUT the level at which candidates are selected (i.e. central or local) has no effect on the number of women elected. * Parties on Left (e.g. social democrats) more likely to elect women than parties on the right (and Caul 2001 => parties on Left more likely to adopt quotas) * Women in party executive, and more women party activists => quota rules and/or more women candidates => more women elected. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION The Global Impact of Quotas (Tripp & Kang 2008) | * Proportional representation (party list) increases by a relatively significant amount the number of women in parliament (approx. 5%). Quotas increase representation by ≈7% * Girl's education (proxy for gender equality), region, and religion also significant * Focus on Lesotho: "The introduction of quotas offers the most explanatory power for women's representation today, together with electoral systems that allow for greater candidate turnover (i.e. party-list PR systems)." * BUT quota-mandated female representation either has no effect on or reduces several dimensions of women's self-reported engagement with local politics. * Literature has shown exposure to female representation can have a symbolic effect on female citizens (India), and can create different social expectations of gender, but also exacerbate existing biases if female are seen as violating traditional roles. * Whether reserved EDs caused a "woman-led backlash" isn't tested but councillors in such districts often performed better, at times to statistical significance. * +ve effects may take 2 electoral cycles |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION All The President's Men? (Krook & O'Brien 2012) | * New Measure (Gender Power Score) applied to 117 countries * Political variables, rather than social, have the greatest impact on gender parity in cabinets. * 60% of data explained by 'political elites' hypothesis, 20% by institutions. BUT, only 105 countries were well classified. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Daycare Coverage in Norway (Bratton & Ray (2002) | * Percentage of children covered by childcare in Norwegian local council increased faster in constituencies with 50% or more female representation. * More women's representation => greater social and economic equality for women. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Women's Representation in American History (Miller 2008) | * Investigates state-level women's suffrage laws enacted between 1869 and 1920 * "Politicians respond immediately to shifts in electoral preferences as voting rights were extended to women." * Within a year of suffrage law enactment, local health spending rose by 35% |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION The Politics of Presence (Loveduski & Norris 2003) | * Data: 1,000 national politicians (candidates & members) in 2001 general election. * Controlling for party, no significant differences among men and women across values concerning free market economy, Europe, moral traditionalism. * BUT, controlling for common social background variables, men and women significantly differ in each party on values directly linked to women's interests. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Impact of LGBT Legislators (Reynolds 2013-5) | * Applies arguments from the established literature on women's representation to LGBT legislators. * Controlling for social values, democracy, government ideology, electoral system design, the presence of openly gay legislators can have a significant effect on gay rights legislation |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Grey 2002 | * Increasing representation of women in the New Zealand parliament, 1975-1999 (from <5% to 30%), influences parliamentary debates about paternal leave, in turn changing NZ parental leave policies for men and women. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Htun, Lacalle & Micozzi (2013) | * Increased representation of women in the Argentine Congress leads to more women-sponsored legislation & more legislation promoting women's rights (often sponsored by women) |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Lovenduski 1995 | * Women politicians prioritise policies on labour market equality, childcare, education, pensions, elderly care, etc. * BUT these are often priorities of (men and women) in left parties => hard to identify the independent effect of women. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Thomas 1994 | * Investigates gender and committee assignments in the US Congress. => Women are more likely than men to want to join (and be assigned to) health and welfare committees. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect (Anzia & Berry 2011) | * US Congresswomen sponsor more bills than Congressmen => women have to be better "quality" to get elected. * Argue voter bias and women's perception of sex discrimination in the electoral process/underestimation of talents explain this. *Some support exists in the literature, e.g. Pew (2008) => 21% of Americans believe men make better leaders. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Wӓngnerud (2006) | * Looks at policy priorities of Swedish MPs - different policy preferences of men and women in the '80s and ealy '90s. * BUT the difference starts to decline as more women are elected to parliament in all political parties & as society makes progress on gender equality. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Origins of the Gender Gap (Fox & Lawless 2011) | * Despite having comparable credentials and abilities, women are substantially less likely than similar men to perceive themselves as qualified for office. * The nature of the American electoral system likely exacerbates traditional gender socialisation that depresses this self-efficacy. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation (Norris & Inglehart 2001) | * Culture matters when it comes to representation. * Demonstrated by Australia, the USA, and Spain, attitudes towards women aren't the sole answer, and changing them will take time, but this is key to improved representation. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) | * Key difference between and within democracies and non-democracies is the size of the "winning coalition." * Smaller winning coalition (e.g. non-democracies) => more "kleptopcracy" => less investment => less growth. * Larger winning coalition (e.g. democracies, particularly presidential systems & coalitions) => provision & protection of public goods => more investment => higher growth. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE A "Resource Curse" (Ross 2001) | * A key factor influencing the relationship between political regime performance and economic performance is whether the economy is dependent on natural resources. * More oil => lower POLITY score. Przeworski et al. (2000) dropped the oil-rich Middle Eastern states from their analysis. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Political Economy of the Resource Curse (Ross 1999) | * 27 of 36 states in the World Bank's "most troubled category," severely indebted low-income countries, are primarily commodity exporters * Not a generalisable theory, but many authors trace Latin America's aversion to discarding import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) to its resource wealth. * Similarly, many authors have linked the curse to the failure of states to enforce property rights through state-ownership of resource industries. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Persson & Tabellini 2003) | * The executive in presidential systems is more directly accountable, with more checks and balances → more difficult to change policies → less public debt vs. parliamentary systems Majoritarian systems → two-party systems → single-party gov't→ more responsive & decisive gov't → less public debt vs. PR systems |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Electoral Systems & Consumer Prices (Rogowski & Kayser 2002/Change et al. 2011) | * How much can political institutions explain prince differences? * Producers want regulations which allow them to charge higher prices; Consumers want regulations which allow for more competition between producers. * Majoritarian systems => parties respond mainly to preferences of customers. * PR systems => parties respond to well-organised producer interests => increasing regulations. * Majoritarian systems should have lower consumer prices => approx. 1% lower in SMDs. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Clark, Golder & Golder (2013) | * “Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that although democracy is often sufficient for ensuring a high level of citizen well-being, it is certainly not necessary; some dictatorships perform at relatively high levels as well.” * Relationship between level of democracy and other measures of material well-being is plotted => Democracies frequently fail to outperform a significant number of dictatorships. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Political Competition & Economic Growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001) | * Market competition is a necessary step towards prosperity, but it is not sufficient. * Those who depend on a small coalition face political harm if they promote good public policy - institutions are needed to rectify this. * If authoritarian leaders face a choice between growth & retaining office, they will naturally choose the latter. More often, they will use resources to their own benefit, sometime to encourage growth. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Varieties of Capitalism and Economic Performance (Hall and Soskice 2001) | * Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) (e.g. US, UK): Low market regulation and little gov't intervention in markets => more competitive markets => short-term investment, high unemployment. * Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) (e.g. Germany, Japan): High market regulation, coordination of employment regulations between business, labour & gov't => less competitive markets => long-term investment, lower unemployment. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Political Regimes and Economic Growth (Przeworski & Limongi 1993) | * "Our guess is that political institutions do matter for growth, but thinking in terms of regimes does not seem to capture the relevant differences." * 18 studies on the topic are analysed: 8 found in favour of democracy, 8 authoritarianism, 5 no difference. * 8 of 11 results published before 1988 found authoritarianism grew faster, but this wasn't supported by any studies after the period, suggesting a link between statistics and ideology. |
| ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Democracy & Economic Growth (Przeworski et al. 2000) | * Cases: 141 countries, 1950-1990 * o ”There is no trade-off between democracy and development, even for poor countries… the entire controversy seems much ado about nothing." * With incomes below $3,000, the two regimes show almost identical performance. * Affluence differentiates regimes |
| REGIMES Rebellion in the House of Commons (Benedetto & Hix 2007) | * In parliamentary systems, carrots (e.g. promise of ministerial office) and sticks (e.g. threat of an early election if gov't loses a key vote) can be used to force MPs to vote along party lines. * Since 1960, certain forms of rebellion have been on the increase - ex. ministers or those who have been rejected from promotion are free to vote against the gov't. * Data from 2001-2005 shows a distinct group of MPs voting against the gov't. The longer a party is in gov't, the larger the group of potential rebels, less susceptible to carrots & sticks. |
| REGIMES Carey (2007) | * Provides some evidence on party cohesion, using data on 268 parties in 19 parliaments. * Variations in the strength of parliaments is related to whether or not a country has a tradition of single-party gov't. One party means a stronger parliament. |
| REGIMES Comparing Democratic Systems (Horowitz 1990) | * The claims made by Linz regarding the disadvantages of presidentialism are "not sustainable." They are based on skewed data, rest on a mechanistic view of presidency, and assume a particular system of electing a president. *In postcolonial Africa, parliamentarism would be the "institutional villain." The adoption of a presidency in Nigeria, 1978-9 was one of "the most impressive efforts at redemocratisation." * Key issues: plurality elections, adversary democracy - these underlie Linz;s argument, making it easy to turn against parliamentarism. Linz is not in favour of parliamentary systems, but parliamentary coalitions. |
| REGIMES The Perils of Presidentialism (Linz 1990) | * Presidential regimes are prone to political breakdown (e.g. Latin America) * Presidential regimes frequently generate presidents who cannot count on a majority in parliament, which is composed of individual legislators rather than cohesive parties => stalemate/gridlock. * Presidential regimes lack a mechanism to resolve conflict, meaning divided gov't leads to regime collapse. |
| REGIMES Governments are Similar in Both Systems (Cheibub & Limongi 2007) | * Traditional theses on the shortfalls of presidentialism are "misguided." The way gov'ts are formed is insufficient grounds to deduce how political systems function. * Other provisions (e.g. constitutional) also have a causal effect on the way in which regimes work, and could counteract the effect of regime type. * Decision-making is the key difference - decentralisation is a major issue, but is not unique to presidentialism. |
| REGIMES Electoral Accountability (Hellwig & Samuels 2008) | * Investigate the effect of regime type on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. * Regime does determine how, and the extent to which, elections enable voters to regard or sanction politicians. * Data from 75 countries shows, ceteris paribus, voters have a greater ability to hold politicians to account under the separation of powers in presidentialism. * Pure/semi-presidential systems "appear to provide the potential for 'the best of both worlds'" between PR and majoritarian systems. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Explaining Central Bank Independence (Bernhard 1998) | * Statistical tests on cross-national variation in central bank institutions. * "The information asymmetries of the monetary policy process create potential conflicts between backbench legislators, coalition partners, and government ministers. The severity of these conflicts conditions politicians' incentives regarding the choice of central bank institutions." * Ministers have informational advantages in the policymaking process, creating potential grounds for conflict, which can be alleviated with an independent bank." |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Cukierman et al. (1992) | "Institutions cannot absolutely prevent an undesirable outcome, nor ensure a desirable one, but the way that they allocate decision-making authority... makes some policy outcomes more probable and others less likely." |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Judicial Selection and Death Penalties (Canes-Wrone et al. 2014) | * Most US Supreme Court Justices face elections or reappointment by elected officials. The effects are studies against 12,000 death penalty decisions. * External pressure vs. accountability: A fundamental challenge. Judges facing reappointment or partisan elections are not so responsive to majority opinion, but are responsive to changes in levels of support. Contrary to ABA wisdom, non-partisan elections encourage judges to cater to majority support. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Central Bank Independence (McNamara 2002) | * Central bank independence rests on "contestable theoretical arguments and inconclusive empirical evidence about the relationship between democracy, policymaking, and economic outcomes." * Delegation to technocratic expertise "does not apoliticise monetary policy." * Delegation is linked to substantive outcomes. The gov't-bank relationship is not necessarily the most significant influence on economic outcomes, like societal groups. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Dutch Supreme Court and Euthanasia (Steunenberg 1997) | * Analysis of the legislature and judiciary of the dutch system, focusing on euthanasia. * The court is seen as a policy advocate, rather than a policy conserver => like any political player, it has well-defined policy preferences. * The legislature was unable to either maintain the SQ or set a new statuatory policy that could be supported by a majority in parliament, hence the courts were able to give a new interpretation of euthanasia provisions to a more liberal position. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Alessina & Summers 1995 | |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Delegation to Non-Majoritarian institutions (Thatcher & sweet 2002) | * NMIs have become increasingly empowered over the past 50 years, at the national level (e.g. media & telecoms regulation) and supranational (e.g. ECJ & ECB). Questions legitimacy and accountability. * Purely function accounts of delegation are inadequate. The range of outcomes are impossible to predict, produced by the dynamics of interactions between both NMIs and other actors. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS From Doves to Haws (Hix et al. 2010) | * 11th Jan 2007: The MPC increased interest rates from 0.25% to 5.25% with a vote of 5 to 4. Why the different votes? * Cross-time spatial analysis of the MPC: "Hawks" prefer higher interest rates to "doves." * The analysis does not fit a "political business cycle," BUT through its appointment power, the British Gov't has been able to move the median MPC voter. Appointments matter. |
| INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS Mueller 2003 (cited in Hix et al. 2010) | * If the gov't cannot credible commit not to interfere with macropolicy in general, it cannot credibly commit not to meddle with the central bank. * Rogoff 1985: CB independence is an effective institutional measure in delivering low and stable inflation. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Democratic Deficit (Moravcsik 2002) | * The EU isn't perfect, but neither are stable democracies => "EU may be more representative precisely because it is less democratic." * Liberal intergovernmental theory: Hard bargaining reduces gap between policy preferences of national gov'ts and the EU outcome (EU policies are centrist). * Policies reflect the preserences of the gov'ts (no 'policy drift'): The EU is an intergovernmental organisation. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Majone 1999 | * The EU is a regulatory state => EU policies should benefit all member states/citizens. * EU gov'ts have delegated certain powers to the EU institutions to facilitate economic integration in Europe. * Policy is generally generated in everyone's best interests. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Hix & Hoyland (2011 [1999]) | * EU policy outcomes are often redistributive => a supranational political system. * Like other political systems: Preferences + Institutions => Outcomes. * The supranational institutions and interest groups have some autonomy to shape outcomes. There are winners and losers, contra Majone (e.g. on environmental policy). |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Majone 2009 | * If the EU works as it should (as a largely regulatory body), then EU decisions should be isolated from democratic politics, so that no particular political majority can capture policies (e.g. like courts and central banks). * Delegation to govern in the collective interests of Europe - this is the purpose of the EU. We don't want it to be more democratic. * Credibility crisis is not the same as lack of democracy. Technocrats are better for accountability and policy equality even if they don't fit median voter preference. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Hix 2008 | * The EU is not as democratic as it could/should be. * The EP elections do not give voters any choice. * There should be a more open contest for the commission President. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Democracy (Follesdal 1998) | The EU does not satisfy such conditions for democracy as competition for control over political authority, an electoral mechanism where expressed preferences over others determines the outcome, or that the government is as responsive to the majority as possible. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Reif & Schmitt 1980 | * EP elections are 'second-order national contests', like regional or local elections => fought by national parties. * Two consequences: (1) lower voter turnout compared to national elections, (2) people cote on domestic issues, but either protest vote, or vote to signal their policy concerns. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Democratic Deficit in the EU (Hix & Folesdal 2006) | * Lack of competition for seats in the EC: Succession procedures are independent of voting, meaning little incentive to change policies, lack of competition => policy drift. * EU citizens elect their gov'ts who sit on the council, but this creates insulation. Gov'ts can pursue policies not possible on the domestic level. The EC is the agenda setter, but is independent of voting - democratic? * The EP has little agenda-setting power, and can only amend legislation after it has been proposed. |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Democratic Dilemma (Dahl 1994) | * Trade-off between preserving the authority of a small democratic unit, or delegating power to a larger political system to deal more effectively with important matters. Answer of the Greek Polis? * But the likelihood of even moderately democratic transnational associations is poor [Dahl 1999: "We should openly recognise that international decision-making would not be democratic." |
| SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT Koenig-Archibugi 2010 | Arguments based on 'necessary conditions' are not compelling. Global democracy is not impossible. |
| VETO PLAYERS Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002) | Proposition 1: more veto players => less policy change. It will decrease the winset as the overlap will likely be smaller. Fewer policies can thus defeat the SQ. Proposition 2: Bigger policy distance between veto players => less policy change, under the same principle. The veto player who sets the agenda has a comparable advantage as he can consider the winset of others as his constraint, and select the preferred outcome accordingly. |
| VETO PLAYERS Pros and Cons (Ganghof 2003) | * Implication of veto player theory: policies are only shaped by VPs - with significantly polarised interests, changing the SQ will be difficult * Problem of identification: VPs vs. potentially influential actors. Are powerful actors like courts really VPs, and to what extent are groups of individuals collective VPs? * Problem of preference measurement: Once relevant VPs are identified, their preferences must be determined (however roughly). The majority of particular predictions or explanations depend on such preference attributions * Problem of equivalence: Are the relevant VPs really similar in all respects (other than policy preferences), or should it be necessary to distinguish different types of VPs? |
| WEEK 10 Majoritarian vs. Consensus Democracy (Lijphart 1994) | * Majoritarian democracy: gov't by/for the people = gov't by majority => No constraints on the will of the majority, e.g. the Westminster model. * Consensus democracy: gov't by/for the people = gov't by consensus => constraints on the will of the majority, e.g. coalitions and/or presidents. * Bivariate analysis on 10 performance variables shows that Consensus democracy is better in terms of representation, and at least as good in terms of other variables (no statistical significance) |
| WEEK 10 Democracy W/O Veto Players (McGann & Latner 2013) | * Lijphart & Tsebelis's characterisation of consensus democracies with consensus, vetos, and policy stability is "under-theorised" PR-majority rule should have greatest policy flexibility. *Tsebelis assumes coalition partners in multi-party gov'ts are veto players. Parties outside the winning coalition could also split it. *In measuring types of democracy, the authors focus on institutional outcomes: PR-majority rule, supermajority power-sharing, supermajority winner-take-all, and Westminster. * Empirical testing: PR-majority rule should be most flexible, supermajority systems should exhibit less change over time. Winner-takes-all without checks will have mobility as gov'ts alternate |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Mayhew (1991) | * The success of policy is not very different in unified or divided gov’ts. * BUT Tsebelis (1999) argues this is because Mayhew focusses on the USA, which has divided gov’t built into its nature. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Mueller and Strøm (2000) | * Average gov’t duration is longest in a single-party majority, least in a minority coalition. Data from 1945-1998. * BUT minimal winning coalitions aren't far behind, 850 days compared to 950 days. * Single-party minority is behind a minimal coalition, just 600 days. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004 | Ministerial turnover is higher in single-party gov’t than minimal-winning coalitions as it is harder for leaders to remove ministers in a coalition. 40% reduction in likelihood of leaving the cabinet in a MWC. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Strøm (1990) | * Notes a frequency of minority governments in Western Europe between 1945 and 1998, and these were very stable governments. * Single-party gov’t can lead to political uncertainty as gov’ts can swing from one side of the left-right scale to the other. This can have a negative impact on investment, whereas when businesses know another coalition will form, they can be more certain that policies won’t change dramatically. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Hellwig & Samuels (2008) | High clarity elections lead to greater accountability with regards the economy. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Warwick 1994 | The bigger the policy/ideological difference between coalition partners, the shorter the duration of gov’t. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Tsebelis 1999 | * As the number of veto players/distance between them increases, the winset of the status quo does not decrease (i.e. policy stability does not decrease). * Greater ideological range in a coalition => fewer significant laws. Data: 15 western democracies. Minimum winning coalitions have the most significant laws, up to a certain ideological range. * More veto players => less policy change. Could be troublesome following exogenous shocks and crisis. * BUT adding extra veto players does not necessarily increase policy stability, but in one dimension this depends on the maximum ideological distance among veto players. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Huber & Powell (1994) | * PR systems produce gov’ts which are actually closer to the median voter. *If voters are presented with only two clear alternatives, these tend to be distant from the ideal policy point of the median voter, whereas high variety of choice increases the change of the median voter actually obtaining a gov’t closer to his ideal point. * Coalitions better represent the median voter as there are more veto players, and reflect a microcosm of society. * 28% difference between gov’t position and median voter in single-party gov’t, only 20% in PR systems. * BUT in mixed/proportionate influence systems, congruence is better during majority gov’t than minority gov’t. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Axelrod (1970) | Policy seeking theory – parties will try to maximise their influence over policy outcomes => only connected coalitions should form between parties next to each other on a policy scale. |
| CABINETS & COALITIONS Riker (1962) | Office-seeking theory – parties will try to maximise their number of cabinet seats => only minimum-winning coalitions should form |
| REGIMES Presidential vs. Parliamentary (Hiroi and Omori 2009) | * Provide statistical tests on the experiences of 131 democracies, 1960-2006. The data questions whether or not parliamentary regimes are categorically superior to presidential ones. * Uninterrupted parliamentary democracies do face lower risk of first breakdown compared to presidential systems. BUT, where democracy has failed in the past, the pattern reverses, and parliamentary democracies can face a higher risk of breakdown. * Further, the risk of a previously failed democracy collapsing again rises as the (risk of) gov’t crises increases. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION (Thames and Williams 2010) | * Solely concentrating on district magnitude when it comes to women's representation is insufficient. * Systems with weak incentives for personal votes (party-centred) increase representation in comparison to candidate-centred systems. * Statistical tests support this claim - Closed list PR would thus be preferable to open-list. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Htun and Weldon (2012) | * In studying violence against women, the authors find that feminist mobilisation, not political phenomena like leftist parties, women in gov't, or economic factors, best accounts for policy development. * Social mobilisation transforms social practice and public opinion. * The test is, of course, focussed on violence against women. These kind of effects could be restricted to issues of higher salience. The authors themselves note that some policy areas may be affected by other means. * What's causing the social movement? Successful women in gov't? |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Fox and Lawless 2014 | * Focus on survey responses from a national sample of 4,000 high school and college students to identify the factors affecting interest to run for office. * Even after identifying factors like encouragement and self-confidence, women, particularly once in college, are at a disadvantage. They are much less likely to perceive running for office as the best force for social change. * Political socialisation matters - gender dynamics are at play in deciding to run for office. * From a young age, men's political interests are piqued in ways women's are not. |
| WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION Wӓngnerud (2009) | * Women politicians lead to the strengthening of women's interests. * Gender differences can be a vehicle for change. Wӓngnerud argues she believes it impossible to move to higher representation without visible divisions. * This is a literature review, rather than a statistical study. |
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