Aristotle's Ethics

Pregunta	Respuesta
(Teleological Ethics) The Content of Ethics You should understand: Aristotle's function argument for the claim that the ultimate human good is rational activity in accordance with virtue - the status of the Doctrine of the Mean, i.e. a decision procedure or metaethical claim about what virtue is? - Objections	Things to think about: - Is Aristotle's function argument successful? - Does the Doctrine of the Mean provide practical guidance?
The Normativity of Ethics You should understand: - Aristotle's teleological assumptions - how this relates to the question of whether we have reasons to be moral (virtuous)	Things to think about: - does Aristotle provide a satisfactory account of the normativity of ethics? - Do those who have been badly brought up have reasons to be virtuous?
Aristotle's philosophical ethics as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics is a counterpart to those of other historical figures such as Mill and Kant.	- Aristotle is concerned with the ultimate good and not a criterion of right or wrong. - He focuses on character rather than action. - It is ideal based rather than law based - He holds a teleological view of the world (purpose and design doctrine).
Aristotle's ethics has as its basic foundation an appeal to the telos or end: 1. this explains how things in nature tend to behave. 2. this provides a standard for evaluating these things.	Human telos: flourishing/eudaimonia: 1. Humans tend to aim at their own eudaimonia in their actions. 2. Can serve as the standard by which we can evaluate people as good/bad.
As, for Aristotle, everything has a telos, the world is naturally infused with normativity. There is no strict division between 'is' and 'ought' such as for Kant. This contrasts to a more modern view in which nature is in fact bereft of normativity.	Moore raised an OQA against Mill's ethics which showed that ethical naturalism is problematic as it is hard to see how a natural object, event, or property could provide reasons for action. Thus we would have to appeal to something else for normativity.
There are three options: i) Divine Command: supernatural being imposes laws. ii) Kant: as practically rational agents, we impose reasons for action upon ourselves. iii) Intuitionists: Intrinsically normative, non-natural properties (Ross, Moore, Prichard).	However does Aristotle have this problem? Due to him holding a teleological view of the world, there is not a problem in reconciling naturalism with normativity. As stated, nature itself is normative as everything has a telos/end.
Nature is full of inbuilt purposes which provide guidance on how to act and which (can) set standards for how beings should act. Does this then mean that Aristotle's normativity of ethics provides (good) reason to be moral?	Other points: - Ethical investigation is a posteriori - Ethical facts are natural facts - Ethics is objective - There are no fundamental guiding principles - Unifying concept: eudaimonia (human telos). - Ethics is normative for Aristotle
All objectivity, normativity and content of ethics for Aristotle appeal to the human telos and function.	Based upon his objectivity which considers ultimate ends and ultimate goods of humans, Aristotle will give an account of the ultimate end which appeals to function. He can appeal to what we think as evidence given his teleology. (Mill argues in a similar way but cannot make this same appeal due to lacking the teleological aspects).
Content Function is our (humans) characteristic activity. A being's function and it's Telos are ultimately related (the notion of function is implicit in the notion of telos). The good or doing well resides in the function.	By reflecting on a things function, we can grasp the correct standards for that thing. This is thus what counts for that thing to be doing well or to be a good specimen of its kind.
e.g. a knife A knife's telos would be that it is a 'good knife', to be easily manipulable, to be sharp and various other knife-like features. By appeal to the telos, we can evaluate whether a knife is good or bad. The same could be done for an acorn or any other such thing.	What of humans? For this, Aristotle suggests that we focus upon what is distinctive about human beings. He defines this as our rational activity; in that we are theoretical and practical (beings).
Doing well as a human (attaining your own goal) will involve the excellent performance of the human function. For Aristotle, excellence meant virtue.	Telos/Ultimate Good: rational acitivity of the soul in accordance with virtue. (The 'soul' is roughly the way in which you are internally organised ; this is a key aspect of Aristotle's doctrine).
Function Argument P1. Characteristic function of humans is the rational activity of the soul. P2. Being a good specimen of humanity will involve the excellent perfomance of the function - rational activity in accordance with virtue.	P3. Being a good specimen of an X is to attain what is good for the X. (For something to carry out its function well is for it to attain its good). C. The ultimate good (eudaimonia) is the rational activity in accordance with virtue.
Problem 1 P1 is false. If function requires distinctiveness, then rational activity is not the human function as this is not our distinctive function. What of non-human rational beings, or non-rational humans? These are valid counterexamples thus, this cannot be our distinctive function.	Response 1 Rational non-humans: if there were any such examples of these, Aristotle would call them 'human' or call us 'rational'. Non-rational humans: distinguish between human beings and fully developed humans (persons); the former have a different internal organisation hence they have a different/no telos and are not subject to the same standards. (Soul may lack the rational part/ the appetitive aspect). Note that we are all humans and can err and make mistakes; how does this affect this?
Problem 2 P1 is false as it is not just that rational activity is not our distinctive function but that there are other things besides rational activity that are distinctive of human beings. Thus if we do not have one/a distinct function, then the argument fails.	Response 2 The common denominator would always be rational activity; it is always what everything regarding humans would eventually come down to. Williams: killing for fun, making fire. Thus, maybe the whole argument does not have to fail.
Problem 3 P3 is false; even if we assume Aristotle's Teleological view of the world, we might wonder whether being a good specimen of X necessarily leads to it attaining its good...	...Korsgaard: it is not obvious that a horse achieves its own good in being a 'good horse' if what that means is a horse good for military purposes; it is far too strong a claim.
Response 3 We would have to either claim that this really is good for the horse or claim that the function of the horse is not to engage in human military adventures.	Upon this, there seems to be a need to distinguish between 'assigned' and 'natural' purpose(s). However does this really help? Surely this seems to overcomplicate the whole issue? It seems that this cannot be easily solved.
General Problem It may seem that a general problem is that the whole argument presupposes a teleological view of the world that we no longer share; we do not still think that humans have a telos/purpose. Is it thus possible to develop a non-teleological view of the function argument?	Response Perhaps we can think of 'function' not as being connected with a goal or purpose, but rather as simply picking out how we live the distinctive sort of human life that we do (functioning). Maybe we could take the same perspective of Mill in that ethics is based on 'observation and experience'. We just function according to what and how we do things.
Upon this, to say that X has a function is just to say it has a way of doing what it does; it has a (particular) way of functioning. Our way of functioning is through engaging in rational activity, such as deliberation, considering reasons for belief/action.	Being this sort of (human) being means that we are subject to certain normative standards that are constitutive of being that sort of being. Upon this, it would be possible to have a non-teleological function argument. There is no suggestion that we are working towards a set end/purpose, just that we function.
Aside from these problems, we need to consider what the human virtues are in order to get a full account of our ultimate goal. Aristotle does not, remember, provide a list of principles. He does this for two reasons...	i) Ethics is a messy and imprecise subject matter. We need to start from what is roughly true of it and then build upon this. ii) Ethical knowledge is know-how. It is not a body of theoretical knowledge. (Observation and experience).
Virtue, for example, is something that is acquired by habituation. It is done through the mimicking of the virtuous until one gains the relevant dispositions; we learn virtuous behaviour. (observation and experience). Virtue/Practical Wisdom is seen as a sort of perceptual capacity/ability. It is being able to see what is appropriate in a given situation.	Compare this to learning how to play an instrument. You may be able to formulate some general principles, but it will be unclear that they will be of much use. Having a perceptual capacity requires that we are brought up in an environment where there are virtuous people around to train us; we need the right environment to flourish. Consider an acorn and becoming a tree.
Virtues are the things which equip humans to flourish: acting in accordance with the virtues is thus (a) flourishing. Virtue is a disposition to act or feel in a certain sort of way which involves choice. As it involves choice, it involves acting for a reason...	...this reason being: the person with virtue, such as temperance, will choose virtue for its own sake. They will see that something such as moderation is a human excellence and this will constitute their ideal; they will take pleasure in this activity.
Virtue lies in a mean (relative to us). It is a disposition which aims at a sort of 'intermediate' which lies between two vices. This leads us to one of Aristotle's main doctrines upon Ethics...	The Mean Take a particular sphere of human action or feeling. Virtue is getting it right, which is to say that you are finding some sort of mid-point between two ways of getting it wrong (too much/too little); it is the appropriate response to a situation. Excess and deficiency are both wrong.
Take the example of courage: Virtue: courage Sphere of action/feeling: feeling fear/confidence in response to danger. Vices: feeling too much fear, lacking in confidence (cowardice); feeling too little fear and having too much confidence (rashness) Feeling the appropriate fear or the appropriate confidence would be courage. To feel this would be hitting the mean.	Clarification on the Mean i) vice is not having the virtue to too great a degree. ii) relative to us: what counts as appropriate will be partially determined by your circumstances (still objective); how strong you are etc. iii) it is not a command to moderation: sometimes the mean will involve extreme action or feeling. It is what is appropriate for the situation; this is virtue.
What is the Doctrine of the Mean supposed to be; is it an action guiding principle? If it supposed to be, then its content is very thin and is almost platitudinous (trite); avoids too much and too little	It may be useful to use/consider when acquiring virtue if we are not fully virtuous. - This is not a problem for Aristotle given his views about the nature of ethical knowledge as know-how. Virtue is instilled in us by habituation; performing actions that the virtuous would do, thus learning.
Is it however a simple metaethical (nature of ethics) thesis about what virtue is? Virtue involves some sort of balance (mean) and vice involves a deviation. Virtues and vices tend to come in triads.	However...what of temperence? This does not fit with the model of virtues and vices. The natural thought here is that licentiousness (insensibility is the supposed deficiency) and temperence are opposites; there is no vice of deficiency...
Do we really think that it is a vice if someone does not enjoy bodily pleasures enough? Although such people are few and far between, there seems that there would be something deficient in them. As embodied beings who can experience pleasure and pains, we are not flourishing unless we experience these to an appropriate degree (presumably this would be more than nothing at all).	However, justice is even more problematic. Aristotle himself really struggles to fit this into the triad of vice and virtue. Sphere of action/feeling: giving and taking things, concern for what one gets Vices: not giving enough/too great a concern with what one gets (greed); not taking enough/not enough concern with what one gets (what is this?)
It is hard to see how exactly this would be a vice. Possibly injustice however this seems an uncomfortable fit. Justice does not seem to fit properly at all and thus we could take it to be a counterexample.	Perhaps there is something to be said for the claim that not taking your fair share or not being concerned with getting your fair share involves some form of injustice. Yet it still does not seem to fit greatly. Appeal to the telos of human beings?
Why does Aristotle believe his virtues are virtues? Their rational action in accordance with these is constitutive of attaining the human goal. Yet does he still just assume what would be a virtue upon this?	Response Aristotle will see these as the products of years of practical experience (remember he believes in ethical know-how). Generations upon generations have come to see these as the sorts of traits that will lead to a flourishing life (habituation). Ethics is an a posteriori investigation.
Note: to fail, to be concerned with what you get, is a failing on the part of the individual given our telos. However this will not impress us if we have rejected the appeal to telos.	Thus: Aristotle's justification for the list of virtues: Product of experience: it is an a posteriori ethical epistemology. Unlike Mill, Aristotle can appeal to Telos to ground the plausibility of this. (Mill has to try to avoid appeal to a priori sources)
Practical Wisdom This is an intellectual virtue which is supposed to underwrite our capacity to choose what character virtue requires in each scenario. To see what is noble, Aristotle does not think that flourishing/virtue is determined by what the Practically Wise do and feel; they are just able to see what it dictates.	Normativity Why should I be moral? For Aristotle this could be taken more specifically as being why should I be a good human being? Generally speaking, humans will be attracted to flourishing naturally (especially if you are brought up in the right environment) - Teleology
But in any case, we are just subject to these evaluative standards by dint of being a human; it is in virtue of our telos. However, if you have been brought up badly, then there is not much to be said. You are a bad human worthy of contempt; those who are viscious are simply bad and nothing can be done. But maybe 'should' and 'ought' are out of place in this context; they may have just missed hitting the mean.	Problem Even putting the problems of telos aside, one might wonder where this leaves human agents; even those brought up to value virtue. Are they alienated from ethical standards? You are just subject to them by dint of being human thus they may come to seem arbitrary.
Response This is uncharitable to Aristotle; after all we are supposed to be attracted to flourishing by dint of being human; it seems then that this is our ideal. We could think of the Nicomachean Ethics as a way of painting the ideal to those who might ask: I have been brought up such that I am attracted to virtue and I value certain sorts of actions, but should I be glad that I have been? Aristotle is attempting to answer this by displaying how wonderful the Ideal is; a sort of reflective endorsement of noble life.	To paraphrase Mill Having been brought up to value these things is something we think we would not do well to be without. Problem Does this provide the right sort of justification for ethics? For Aristotle, his normativity of ethics simply lies within the fact of if you have been brought up in a good environment then it would be natural for you to be moral; you will naturally aim to reach the Ideal of flourishing.

Siguiente

Descripción

Resumen del Recurso

Similar

	Creado por Karina De-Bourne hace más de 10 años