pointTextual is sound. The existance of the phrase "in
particular" does not indicate that the list given in 40.3.2 is
exhaustive.
This does not however, mean that the use of the Christian and Democratic nature of the State is a logical conclusion.
While the basis for the enumeraton of the personal rights of the people is sound, the method of doing so was flawed.
The only way to enumerate personal rights is by use of the text of the Constitution. Any other
method has no validity. It is not the nature of the State the we must look at it is the nature of its
Constitution.
Ryan v Attorney General: Established the textual point from which all
other points stem. It also established that the Rights protected under
40.3.1 are not confined to Article 40.
The reasoning for why this extends beyond 40 was that sub section 2 of 40.3 refers to the
rights to life and good name and that there are no rights in connection with these rights in Article
40. Therefore the general guarantee in 40.3 extends beyond 40.
These rights (life and good name) could easily be described as personal rights (40.3.1) Thus we can conclude
that 40.3.1 confers a general protection of personal rights and that 40.3.2 gives examples of these personal rights
that 40.3 protects but that the list is not exhaustive.
This leads to the conclusion that the Rights
contained in 40.3 do not extend bast Article 40.