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Created by Max Schnidman
over 5 years ago
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Question | Answer |
Bellman Equation | \[V(y) = \underset{x}{max} F(x,y) + \beta v(y)\] |
Technologies in Neoclassical Growth | Investment: \[k_(t+1) = (1-\delta)k_t + s_t\] Production: \[y = f(k,l)\] Output: \[c_t + i_t \le y_t\] |
Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium | Time-Zero Trading \[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}p_t * c_t \le [\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}p_t * e_t \forall i\] |
Sequential Trading Equilibrium | \[c_t + q_t*a_{t+1} \le e_t + a_t\] \[a_{t+1} \le A_t\] for each agent i |
Natural Borrowing Constraint | \[A_t = \sum_{t=\tau}^{\infty} p_t * e_t\] |
Arrow-Debreu Market Clearance | \[c_t = e_t\] for each agent i |
Sequential Market Clearance | \[c_t = e_t\] for each agent \[a_{t+1} =0\] across all agents |
Neoclassical Firm Optimization | \[\underset{y_t, k_t, n_t}{max} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t[y_t - r_t*k_t - w_t*l_t\] s.t. \[y_t \le f(k_t,l_t)\] |
Neoclassical Household Optimization | \[\underset{c_t, k_{t+1}}{max} sum_{t=0}^{\infty} beta^t*c^t s.t: \[sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t[c_t+i_t] \le sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t[r_t*k_t + w_t*l_t] + \pi \] \[k_{t+1} = k_t(1-delta_ + i_t\] \[k_0\] given \[c_t \ge 0, k_{t+1} \ge 0\] |
Neoclassical Market Clearance | \[y_t = c_t + i_t\] \[n_t^s = n_t^d\] \[k_t^s = k_t^s\] |
\[\Gamma (x)\] | Constraint space of state variable \[(\{(c_t, k_{t+1}) in R^2: c_t +k_{t+1} <= f(k_t)\}\] |
\[\Pi (x)\] | Set of feasible plans: \[\{\bar{x}: x_{t+1} \in \gamma( x_t) \forall t\}\] |
Assumptions to map Sequential Problem to Bellman Equation (i.e. the solution to the SP is a solution to the FE) | 1. \[\gamma (x)\] is nonempty 2. \[\lim_{t \to \infty} \sum_{t=0}^T beta^t F(x_t, x_{t+1}\] exists for all \[x_0 \in X\] and \[\bar{x} \in \Pi(x_0)\] |
Assumption to map Bellman Equation to Sequential Problem | \[lim_{n \to \infty} beta^n v(x_n) =0 \forall x_0 \in X \ and \ x_bar \in Pi(x_0)\] |
[\G(x)\] | Policy correspondence: \[\{y \in \gamma (x) \subseteq X: v(x) = F(x,y) + v(y)\}\] |
Assumptions to make the Bellman Equation a Fixed Point Problem | 1. X is convex; \[\gamma: X \to X\] is compact-valued, continuous, and non-empty 2. \[F:X x X \to R\] is continuous and bounded; \[\beta \in (0,1)\] |
Contraction mapping | \[(S,\rho)\] is a metric space and \[T: S\to S\]. T is a contraction mapping with mod \[\beta\] if \[\rho(Tx, Ty) \le \rho\beta(x,y)\] |
Blackwell's Sufficient Conditions | 1. Monotonic: \[f(x) \le g(x) \implies Tf(x) \le Tg(x)\] 2. Discounting: There exists \[\beta \in (0,1)\] s.t. \[[T(f+a)(x)]\le (Tf)(x) + \beta a\] |
Properties of v and g | 1. V is strictly increasing 2. V is strictly concave 3. G is continuous and single-valued 4. V is differentiable |
Assumptions for V to be strictly increasing | 1. For each y, \[F(x,y)\] is strictly increasing in X 2. \[x\le x^\prime\] implies \[\gamma (x) \subseteq \gamma (x^\prime)\] |
Assumptions for concavity of V | 1. F is strictly concave 2. \[\gamma\] is convex |
Neoclassical Growth assumptions on F | 1. Continuous 2. \[f(0) = 0\] and there exists \[\bar{x} >0\] s.t. \[f(\bar{x}) = \bar{x}\] (fixed point) 3. Strictly increasing 4. weakly concave 5. Continuously Differentiable |
Neoclassical Growth assumptions on u | 1. u(0) is finite 2. Continuous 3. Strictly Increasing 4. Strictly concave 5. Continuously Differentiable |
Guess and Verify Method | 1. Assume functional form. 2. Substitute into FE 3. Take FOCs and find Policy Function. 4. Substitute back into FE for closed-form constants. 5. Get closed form Policy Function |
Von-Neumann-Morgenstern Preferences | \[U(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s\inS} \beta^t \pi(s^t) u(c_t^i(s^t))\] |
Arrow Securities | \[a_{t+1}^i (s^t, s_{t+1}) \in R\] The number of units of consumption an agent purchases in a given history contingent on a future realization of a state. |
Aggregate State Budget Constraint | \[c_t^i(s^t) + \sum_{s_{t+1}\in S} q_t a^i_{t+1} \le e_t^i(s^t) + a_t^i(s^t)\] |
Stochastic natural debt limit | \[-a_{t+1}^i(s^t, s_{t+1}) \le A^i(s^t, s_{t+1})\] |
Stochastic Sequential Trading Equilibrium | Allocations of consumptions and assets, and arrow prices such that agents optimize subject to budget constraint and debt limit, and markets clear: \[c^i(s^t) = e^i(s^t)\] \[a_{t+1}^i(s^t, s_{t+1}) = 0\] |
Stochastic Contracting Mapping Assumptions | 1. Gamma is non-empty and measurable given some probability space. 2. F is measurable and bounded, and the limit of the sum of its lifetime expectations exists (i.e. there is a finite lifetime utility value) |
Big K, Little k Trick | K as aggregate capital stock, k as individual Price systems as functions of K s.t. \[V(k,K) = u(R(K)k + w(K)n - k^\prime) + \beta V(k^\prime, K^\prime)\] s.t. \[K^\prime = G(K)\] |
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium | Set of pricing functions, law of motion for aggregate capital, household value functions and decision rule, and firm decision rules such that: 1. Given prices and the law of motion, the value and policy function solve the optimization problem. 2. Given prices, firms optimize 3. Markets clear: Capital and labor supply and demand, and consistency between policy function and law of motion. |
Rational Expectations | \[g(K,K) = G(K)\] Consistency Condition |
Stochastic NGM | Stochastic parameters are state variables, and choice variables must be defined in terms of them. |
Intratemporal Labor Decision | \[u_c(c, l)F_n(k,n) = u_l(c,l)\] |
Search Model | \[v_0(w) = max\{v_1(w), b + \beta \int v_o(w^\prime) dF(w^\prime)\}\] \[v_1(w) = \frac{w}{1-\beta}\] |
Reservation Wage | \[v_1(w^*) = b + \beta \int v_0(w^\prime)dF(w^\prime)\] \[w^* - b = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\int_{w^*}^{\Bar{w}} (w^\prime - w^*) dF(w^\prime)\] |
Value functions with Separations | \[v_1(w) = w + \beta(1-\delta) v_1(w) + \beta\delta[b+ E[V_0(w)]]\] \[v_0(w) = max\{v_1(w), b + E[v_0(w)]\}\] |
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