Call for regional
autonomy in managing
great power intervention
Lacked a clear,
concise definition
Soft and open-ended
agreement on broad
principles previously laid out
in the '67 Bangkok
Declaration; not a framework
of legalistic measures
Need to reconcile different
security perspectives
before security cooperation
could take place
P & T concerned with
implications on their
Alliance relationship with US
I security complex; more
concerned with devt of
'regional resilience' through
national resilience instead of
seeking guarantee from
major powers
S convinced her interests
best served by maintaining
involvement of all powers in
the region
TAC Feb '76
Authoritative affirmation of
ASEAN's principles and policies on
interstate behavior
High Council of Ministerial
Representatives set up
Never been used
Aversion against raising acrimonious
issues within ASEAN framework;
avoidance of legal and formal
procedures under ASEAN Way
S M referred PB to ICJ '94
M's preference to refer
Ligitan and Sipadan
dispute to ICJ '97
ARF '94
Loss of US as a regional
counterweight; power vacuum,
strategic uncertainties
Pursue security framework
based on multilateralism and
engagement of external powers
Forum for political
consultations on the new
security situation in SEA
Question ARF's
real impact on
regional security
Focus on dialogue and
confidence-building rather than
concrete military cooperation
Not meant as a military
alliance; forum for consultation
and confidence-building
Intended to be a talk shop;
promote mutual
understanding, create
channels of communication
Turn towards ASEAN's
engagement of major powers and
new multilateralism; huge leap
from old modalities (ZOPFAN)
Relevance of ASEAN's
leadership in ARF
Dialogue could stagnate
ASEAN Way ie. conflict
avoidance and management
insufficient to address real
security problems which cannot
be swept under the carpet
Lack of capacity to resolve
more intractable regional
conflicts ie. South China Sea
SEANWFZ '95
Mooted in '71 with
ZOPFAN Declaration
Twenty
years lag
Lack of common
perspective and
interests; delay ASEAN
cooperation
Turning point in
ASEAN's approach
to regional security
Hitherto reluctance to
embrace formal and legalistic
mechanisms for arms control
Case Studies
Sabah '68
March '68: Eruption of
the 'Corrigedor Incident';
suspension of P-M
relations in Oct '68
Bilateral tensions
continued to escalate
Late Nov '68: M and P
Ambassadors withdrawn
from each other's capitals
Dec '69: 3rd Ministerial
Meeting; Tunku Abdul
Rahman announced
resumption of P-M
bilateral relations
ASEAN used as a platform for
'informal discussions' and
diplomatic efforts vs. bilateral
dispute in official ASEAN forum
Aug '68: Second ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting; issue
not officially raised in
meeting; agreed to a
"cooling-off period"
outside of meeting
Failed to prevent
escalation of tension and
withdrawal of
Ambassadors in Nov '68
Could not and did not
resolve the dispute; did
not play the role of conflict
mediator in a formal sense
Succeeded in preventing any
further escalation of the crisis
to armed hostilities and
destroying the organization
through indirect measures
Important milestone in
ASEAN's early approach
to conflict avoidance
V Reunification
Implications
on ASEAN
Prospects for regional peace
and security + possible major
power intervention
Indochinese
Asylum-seekers
Illegal immigrants issue; security
concern; potential of communist
subversion by agents in the exodus
Concerted ASEAN stand based on
"human considerations" to give
shelter and assistance; but ruled
out granting permanent settlement
Explicitly requested V to "discourage the
illegal outflow of its people; to accept the
return of those who do not meet international
criteria for refugee status; and to expand the
Orderly Departure Programme"
VK Invasion
Diplomatic
efforts
Official collective stand deplored; called
for "the immediate and total withdrawal
of the foreign forces from K territory"
Active collective diplomacy for a
political settlement throughout the 80s
Jakarta Informal
Meetings
Proposals for
"cocktail meetings"
discussed 86-88
Internationalized the conflict;
lobbied for international
diplomatic opposition to Vietnam
Supported CGDK
at international
forums
Lobbied for diplomatic
support from official
dialogue partners
Divergent
interests
Different perceptions of threat
among member states; yet still
need to maintain common
collective diplomatic response
T and S hardliners; T
directly threatened because
of shared borders; S small
state and predominantly
concerned with upholding
ASEAN principles of
non-aggression and
non-intervention
M and I softliners; more
concerned with the
involvement of major
powers; perceived the
threat to emanate from
major power involvement
Kuantan Principle; crack
in ASEAN's collective
position; dropped upon
strong T opposition to
legitimacy of V's K claim
Difference in
approach
March '83: Five-Plus-Two
Talks; proposed by Malaysia;
rope in Vietnam and Laos
for discussions towards
settlement of imbroglio
Resulted in
nothing; opposition
from T and Chinese
that CGDK would
not be represented
at the talks
T policy to pursue ec
opportunities with V;
hoped to enhance T
influence wrt K issue
Seen negatively by
other ASEAN members;
worried softening of
stance might lead to
further V intransigence
Severe test of ASEAN's informal
conflict management
mechanisms, accommodation of
various interests, norm-building
and community-building in SEA
Remarkable solidarity underlying
the firm position it steadfastly
took; collective diplomacy pursued
in spite of moral pressures
Ultimately the UN
which negotiated
the way out of the
imbroglio
South China Sea
Produced the ASEAN Declaration on the
South China Sea; ascertained ASEAN
norms wrt peaceful settlement of disputes
Limitation in
applicability to
China
ARF Meeting '95; China rejected
role of ARF in the dispute; spoke
of China's "indisputable
sovereignty over the islands"
Brought the dispute into
international limelight; diplomatic
cost for Beijing should it use force
Limits to how far ASEAN
was willing to push the PRC