Security Cooperation

Milestones
1. ZOPFAN '71
  1. Call for regional autonomy in managing great power intervention
    1. Lacked a clear, concise definition
      1. Soft and open-ended agreement on broad principles previously laid out in the '67 Bangkok Declaration; not a framework of legalistic measures
  2. Need to reconcile different security perspectives before security cooperation could take place
    1. P & T concerned with implications on their Alliance relationship with US
    2. I security complex; more concerned with devt of 'regional resilience' through national resilience instead of seeking guarantee from major powers
    3. S convinced her interests best served by maintaining involvement of all powers in the region
2. TAC Feb '76
  1. Authoritative affirmation of ASEAN's principles and policies on interstate behavior
  2. High Council of Ministerial Representatives set up
    1. Never been used
      1. Aversion against raising acrimonious issues within ASEAN framework; avoidance of legal and formal procedures under ASEAN Way
        S M referred PB to ICJ '94
        M's preference to refer Ligitan and Sipadan dispute to ICJ '97
3. ARF '94
  1. Loss of US as a regional counterweight; power vacuum, strategic uncertainties
  2. Pursue security framework based on multilateralism and engagement of external powers
  3. Forum for political consultations on the new security situation in SEA
  4. Question ARF's real impact on regional security
    1. Focus on dialogue and confidence-building rather than concrete military cooperation
      1. Not meant as a military alliance; forum for consultation and confidence-building
        Intended to be a talk shop; promote mutual understanding, create channels of communication
  5. Turn towards ASEAN's engagement of major powers and new multilateralism; huge leap from old modalities (ZOPFAN)
  6. Relevance of ASEAN's leadership in ARF
    1. Dialogue could stagnate
  7. ASEAN Way ie. conflict avoidance and management insufficient to address real security problems which cannot be swept under the carpet
    1. Lack of capacity to resolve more intractable regional conflicts ie. South China Sea
  8. SEANWFZ '95
    1. Mooted in '71 with ZOPFAN Declaration
      1. Twenty years lag
      2. Lack of common perspective and interests; delay ASEAN cooperation
    2. Turning point in ASEAN's approach to regional security
      1. Hitherto reluctance to embrace formal and legalistic mechanisms for arms control
Case Studies
1. Sabah '68
  1. March '68: Eruption of the 'Corrigedor Incident'; suspension of P-M relations in Oct '68
  2. Bilateral tensions continued to escalate
    1. Late Nov '68: M and P Ambassadors withdrawn from each other's capitals
  3. Dec '69: 3rd Ministerial Meeting; Tunku Abdul Rahman announced resumption of P-M bilateral relations
  4. ASEAN used as a platform for 'informal discussions' and diplomatic efforts vs. bilateral dispute in official ASEAN forum
    1. Aug '68: Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting; issue not officially raised in meeting; agreed to a "cooling-off period" outside of meeting
    2. Failed to prevent escalation of tension and withdrawal of Ambassadors in Nov '68
  5. Could not and did not resolve the dispute; did not play the role of conflict mediator in a formal sense
    1. Succeeded in preventing any further escalation of the crisis to armed hostilities and destroying the organization through indirect measures
  6. Important milestone in ASEAN's early approach to conflict avoidance
2. V Reunification
  1. Implications on ASEAN
    1. Prospects for regional peace and security + possible major power intervention
  2. Indochinese Asylum-seekers
    1. Illegal immigrants issue; security concern; potential of communist subversion by agents in the exodus
    2. Concerted ASEAN stand based on "human considerations" to give shelter and assistance; but ruled out granting permanent settlement
    3. Explicitly requested V to "discourage the illegal outflow of its people; to accept the return of those who do not meet international criteria for refugee status; and to expand the Orderly Departure Programme"
3. VK Invasion
  1. Diplomatic efforts
    1. Official collective stand deplored; called for "the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from K territory"
      1. Active collective diplomacy for a political settlement throughout the 80s
        Jakarta Informal Meetings
        Proposals for "cocktail meetings" discussed 86-88
    2. Internationalized the conflict; lobbied for international diplomatic opposition to Vietnam
      1. Supported CGDK at international forums
      2. Lobbied for diplomatic support from official dialogue partners
  2. Divergent interests
    1. Different perceptions of threat among member states; yet still need to maintain common collective diplomatic response
      1. T and S hardliners; T directly threatened because of shared borders; S small state and predominantly concerned with upholding ASEAN principles of non-aggression and non-intervention
      2. M and I softliners; more concerned with the involvement of major powers; perceived the threat to emanate from major power involvement
      3. Kuantan Principle; crack in ASEAN's collective position; dropped upon strong T opposition to legitimacy of V's K claim
    2. Difference in approach
      1. March '83: Five-Plus-Two Talks; proposed by Malaysia; rope in Vietnam and Laos for discussions towards settlement of imbroglio
        Resulted in nothing; opposition from T and Chinese that CGDK would not be represented at the talks
      2. T policy to pursue ec opportunities with V; hoped to enhance T influence wrt K issue
        Seen negatively by other ASEAN members; worried softening of stance might lead to further V intransigence
  3. Severe test of ASEAN's informal conflict management mechanisms, accommodation of various interests, norm-building and community-building in SEA
    1. Remarkable solidarity underlying the firm position it steadfastly took; collective diplomacy pursued in spite of moral pressures
  4. Ultimately the UN which negotiated the way out of the imbroglio
4. South China Sea
  1. Produced the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea; ascertained ASEAN norms wrt peaceful settlement of disputes
    1. Limitation in applicability to China
      1. ARF Meeting '95; China rejected role of ARF in the dispute; spoke of China's "indisputable sovereignty over the islands"
  2. Brought the dispute into international limelight; diplomatic cost for Beijing should it use force
  3. Limits to how far ASEAN was willing to push the PRC

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Security Cooperation

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	Created by debbiesther over 9 years ago