Direct Realism - we perceive mind-independent objects
directly (without a mediator)
Strengths
It explains why people have the same
reactions to the same things as me
It is coherent
It is simple (Occam's razor,
only includes the object
and the perceiver)
Weaknesses/critiques
Hallucination - if we can hallucinate
some things, how can we know that all
we are seeing is real? Attacks 'realism'.
The argument doesn't work because it is talking about a
mind-dependent object. Therefore, there is nothing to argue
with, as what you are perceiving isn't even really an object. This
is backed up by the people's testimony, as people who have
experienced hallucinations say that they are aware that they
are hallucinating.
Illusion - If we know that what we are seeing is
not how it is in reality, then we cannot really
know that anything is what we perceive it to be
like. Therefore, there must be a mediator to warp
our perceptions. Attacks 'direct' and 'realism'
Still a direct perception of reality as it is, what
we are perceiving is just the light particles
refracting around the pencil.
Time-Lag - If the stars we are
seeing are not the stars as they
are right now, then we are not
perceiving them directly. Attacks 'direct'
This misunderstands the meaning of 'direct'
as we are still perceiving things as they are, it
just takes a while for the light particles to get
to our eyes.
Perceptual variation - Russel points out
that people's perceptions of one thing
can differ immensely, be it of one person
or different people's perceptions. He uses
the example of a table, as when we move
slightly then we see a different shade of
brown. Because of this, Russel argues
that we must be perceiving M-I objects
through a mediator, as the qualities of
the table are different to different
perceptions.
Relational Properties - include colour. So the colour of the table
changes IN RELATION to other things, like how far away you
stand. Still a direct perception of an m-i object.
Indirect Realism
Locke - Said that the M-I objects give
us 'ideas', which are our perceptions
of the world, and our perceptions of
primary qualities show that things
are M-I, but we must be perceiving
things indirectly, which is why
people's perceptions of things differ
(secondary qualities).
How to tell primary qualities
apart from secondary ones.
Primary qualities can
be accessed by more
than one sense.
Primary qualities are ESSENTIAL to an
object. It wouldn't be that object if it didn't
have it.
Primary qualities can
be measured.
Russel - called Locke's 'ideas' 'sense-data';
these are what we pick up using our organs;
so it is our senses that are the mediators.
Weaknesses/critiques
We can't know anything about the
m-i world if we are not perceiving
things as they are.
We can't even be sure that things exist if we are not perceiving things
directly. We only know about what our sense-data tells us, and not about
something's existence.
Locke points out the involuntary nature of our
experiences. We can choose what we imagine, r what we
think about. We cannot choose what we perceive.
Locke & Trotter-Cockburn - The coherency of our perceptions.
Russel's 'best hypothesis' - since he cannot prove or
disprove that there are or are not m-i objects, Russel
decides to treat both as hypotheses. He comes to the
conclusion that there are m-i objects, as the other option
would include taking people's testimony, and he cannot
be sure that people exist. It is also the simplest conclusion
(Occam's razor).
Berkeley's Idealism - There are no
mind-independent objects.
'To be is to be perceive and to perceive'
An object is a collection of ideas
Berkeley argues that any
form of realism leads to
sceptiism
His Arguments.
The Master Argument
1) If we can know that MI objects exist then we must be able to conceive of a MI object. 2) An MI object is
one that exists even when it is not being conceived by a mind (unconceived). 3) Whenever I conceive of MI
objects, they are, by definition, conceived. 4) It's logically impossible to conceive of an unconceived object.
5) Therefore, we cannot know of MI objects.
But conceiving and perceiving are NOT the same things. He conflates the two.
(Russel) Thoughts can't exist outside the mind,
but objects that are thought about can.
'Killer blow'
The attack on the primary/secondary quality
distinction - he says that you can't say that m-i
objects exist because of the primary/secondary
quality distinction, as primary qualities are subject
to perceptual variation too.
Size depends on how far away you are
speed depends on yours
Something's solidity depends on
how strong you are
However - we could say that sense-data changes,
but the objects we are perceiving do not, as if we
kept a ruler next to an object and moved further
away it would always say they are the same size
Argument for God
1) As (the ideas that comprise) physical objects are m-d, there are three possible causes of my perceptions: ideas, my
mind, and another mind. 2) Ideas themselves don't cause anything. 3) If physical objects depended on my mind, then I
would be able to control what I perceive. 4. But I can't. Perception is quite different to imagining; we are more passive -
the sensations just occur to us, and we can't control them. Imagination is voluntary, but perception is involuntary. 5.
Therefore, physical objects don't depend on my mind. 6) Therefore, physical objects must exist in another mind, which
then wills that I perceive them. 7. Given the complexity and systematicity of our perceptions, that mind must be God.
Counter: Berkeley recognises the issue that if what we are perceiving is God's perceptions that he is pushing onto us, then
that means that he is experiencing pain and he is not meant to have faults. If it is his mind that creates these things, like
pain, then he must also experience them.
But Berkeley counters that God doesn't experience ideas like pain, he
only creates them and imposes them onto us. He is not subject to
these laws himself.
Critiques
Doesn't explain regularity/continuity
God is what is constantly
perceiving everything, keeping it in
existence.
Hallucinations and illusions - If
everything is an idea, then how can
we tell the difference between
hallucinations and 'normal'
perceptions. And how is an illusion
not reality if everything we
perceive involuntarily is all there
is?
Berkeley says that we can tell the difference by the regularity of past
experience. We don't often see elephants floating through the room or
pencils that are bent.
But what if these hallucinations/illusions just kept happening?
This doesn't explain
WHY they happen,
only how we tell the
difference.
This makes hallucinations/illusions
the same thing when they are not.
Idealism leads to 'the trap
of solopsism'. We can't be
sure that other minds
actually exist.
This could just be accepted as an unfortunate side-effect
Some say that others
having minds is just the
simplest solution