Philosophy of Mind

Anexos:

• Substance Dualism

1. FOR
   1. LAW OF IDENTITY ARGUMENTS
   2. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION ARGUMENT
2. CRITICISMS
   1. INITIAL OBJECTIONS
      1. Mind cannot be scientifically investigated
      2. Evolution
      3. Localisation
   2. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
      1. (a) Interactionism
      2. (b) Parallelism
      3. (c) Epiphenomenalism
   3. THE PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM
      1. Origins of the Problem
      2. The Cartesian Legacy
      3. Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument
   4. THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
      1. The Argument from Analogy
         1. Problems with the argument from analogy
      2. Wittgenstein's criteriological response to the problem of other minds

1. LOGICAL BEHAVIOURISM
   1. FOR
      1. It doesn't face the problem of mental causation
      2. It avoids the problem of other minds
   2. CRITICISMS
      1. Behaviourism is vague (problems with dispositions)
      2. Can we apply a behaviourist account to our own mental states?
      3. Behaviour is caused by mental states
      4. Qualia
2. MIND/BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY
   1. FOR
      1. No nomological danglers
      2. The most economical explanation (satisfies Occam's Razor)
   2. CRITICISMS
      1. Individual Differences
      2. The Identity is conceived too narrowly
      3. Irreducibility of consciousness (QUALIA)
      4. The conceivability argument
3. FUNCTIONALISM
   1. CRITICISMS
      1. The Problem of Qualia
         1. Inverted Qualia
         2. Absent Qualia
            1. Blockhead Example
      2. The Problem of Intentionality
         1. Searle's Chinese Room Argument
            1. Objections
               1. The Systems Objection
                  1. Searle's Response
               2. The Robot Objection
            2. Dennett's Defence of Functionalism in response to Searle
   2. FOR
      1. Improvement on other materialist theories
      2. Less species-chauvinist
      3. Closely linked to research programmes in relevant disciplines
         1. Research of computer scientists
         2. Research of cognitive scientists
         3. Research into biological teleology

1. Emergentism
2. Supervenience
3. PROPERTY DUALISM
4. EPIPHENOMENALISM
5. SEARLE'S BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM
   1. CRITICISMS
      1. Objection to Searle's Micro/Macro Analogy
      2. Searle wants it both ways (materialist and dualist)
         1. Searle rejects reductive materialism
      3. Biological Naturatism is a form of property dualism
         1. Searle rejects any version of dualism
            1. Why I am Not a Property Dualist (2002)
               1. Causally reducible
               2. Ontologically irreducible
   2. The Traditional Terminology
      1. Searle says conscious states are:
         1. Ontologically subjective
         2. Qualitative
         3. Have intentionality
         4. Have a spatial location
         5. explained through microphysical processes
         6. causally efficacious
6. ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
   1. FOR
      1. It simplifies our ontology
      2. Removes mind/body interaction body
   2. CRITICISMS
      1. Eliminative Materialism is counter-intuitive
      2. Eliminative Materialism is self-refuting
      3. Is folk psychology as hopeless as eliminative materialism suggests?
      4. Nothing changes except terminology - Norman Malcolm
         1. Patricia Churchland's Response
            1. Many of the criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the theory
            2. Nothing is eliminated, rather EM is about the level of explanation
            3. She would rather call it Revisionary Materialism

Anexos:

• Philosophy of Mind - created from Mind Map