Until quite recently, historians
were wedded the primacy of
the foreign policy. They ignored
or greatly neglected the
importance of domestic policy.
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Bleichroder
From 1859 to Bleichroder's death the two men conferred and collaborated regularly, each
deriving profit from the other's help.
He belonged to what must be called the 'Rothschild
intelligence network', and in time he managed to surpass it
by adding his own strategically placed informants. His
correspondents included some of the leading diplomats and
business men of Europe; they knew that Bleichroder had
easy access to Bismarck, and men like to share
confidences with friends who are close to power.
Bleichroder may have supplied Bismarck with more information than he needed; in turn the Chancellor use Bleochroder to convey
thought and inclinations to foreign leaders without having to rely on more official and possibly less discreet efforts of his ambassadors.
By the 1860's the Berlin banker
considered himself an auxiliary of the
foreign office.
In Bismarck's hardest days
as Chancellor, Bleichroder
proved his loyalty.
Dazzles by
Bismarck's
resourceful
dimplomacy,
historians have
lost sight of the
fact that the wars
of 1864 and 1866
posed major fiscal
problems for a
government that,
because of a
recalitrant Diet
could not raise
extra loans or new
taxes.
In that crisis Bleichroder
pointed the way to an
intricate and probably
unconstitutional solution.
He advocated the
conversion ofthe
government's rights to
shares of the
Colgne-Minden railway,
with which Bleichroder
happened to have had long
connections. The
mobilisation of that
additional capital gave
Prussia the necessary
fiscal backbone for waging
war major war.
After 1971 he continued to play a semi-covert role in
foreign policy. For xample he was involved in Bismarck's
first imperial venture in Samoa. As a freind of Leopold II,
Bleichroder was well versed in African politics.
Assessment: Perhaps one can finally measure his importance by the amount of abuse Bismarck was willing to take to suffer on account of their relationship.Privately in the 1860s and publicly in the
next two decades, Bismarck was maligned for giving a Jew so much power, protection and influence.
The anti-semitic agitators, Franz Perrot and Adolf Stocker, carried the campaign to the masses, depicted Bleichroder as an evil genius of Bismarck foreign and economic policy.
Undemocratic
Bismarck not a fan of democracy - took
his own route to foreign policy.
From his assocation with Bleichroder, his
policies, his pocket, and perhaps even his
psyche profited.
No European statesmen has since dominated his (sic) country for as long
and as completely as did Bismarck. The powers of the state became
specialised and buraucratic, and the land of the informal, intimate
relationship that existed between Bismarck and Bleichroder became less
feasible in the new, so-called mass age.