Philosophy 102

epistemology

metaphysics

physics

metaethics

ethics

The nature of knowledge

Justification

The nature of truth

All of the above

Both (A) and (B)

When it is knowledge

When it corresponds to reality

When it is justified

Both A and B

None of the above

Either A or B is mistaken.

Neither A nor B is mistaken.

Both A and B are correct, relative to their own perspective.

There is no fact of the matter about whether the Canadian government should legalise marijuana.

We cannot conclude anything about this case.

Have no specific answers

have answers that merely express someone's opinions

Can be answered by observational means

Cannot be answered by observational means

Are pointless

It is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false

It is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be true

It is impossible for the premises to be false and the conclusion to be true

It is possible for the premises to be false and the conclusion to be true

The conclusion is plausible

The conclusion is true

The premises are true

It is valid

Both C and D

None of the above

Cogent

Plausible

Implausible

Valid

Invalid

Cogent

Plausible

Implausible

Valid

Invalid

Valid

Sound

Invalid

Unsound

Nonsensical

True

Sound

Valid

Invalid

Unsound

No definite answers to philosophical questions can be known to be true

Philosophical questions enlarge our conception of what is possible

Philosophy should be studied for the sake of the questions themselves

Philosophical questions enrich our intellectual imagination

None of the above

(2) is stronger, in the strict logical sense, than (1)

(1) is stronger, in the strict logical sense, than (2)

(1) and (2) are logical equivalent

There is no strict logical relation between (1) and (2)

One should interpret an author's argument in its most favourable light

One should never question or doubt the conclusion of famous philosophers

One should donate a small portion of one's annual income to a reputable charity

One should never object to an argument whose conclusion is obviously false

(1) is stronger, in the strict logical sense, than (2)

(2) is stronger, in the strict logical sense, than (1)

(1) and (2) are logical equivalent

There is no strict logical relation between (1) and (2)

One argues in a circle

One identities two things as equals when, in fact, they are not

One pretends to know what they are talking about when, in fact, one does not

One uses keywords in various senses in different parts of one's argument

One argues in a circle

One assumes the very thing one is trying to prove

One attempts to prove one's thesis by asking a rhetorical question

Both A and B

None of the above

Argues in a circle

Is invalid

Commits the fallacy of equivocation

Proves too much

Is cogent

Commits a strawman fallacy

Is an ad hominem

Is sound

Reminds me that I must water my plants

any answer

is correct

The truth of utterances of the form "action A done in culture C is morally wrong" is relative to the speaker

Evaluating the norms of our culture is impossible

The deontic status of an action A done in culture C is determined by the moral code of C

Both B and C

There are no moral standards or norms whose correctness or validity is independent of the moral norms a culture does or might accept, and thus they express universally valid moral standards that apply to all cultures

Different cultures have different non-moral beliefs about the natural world

Different strokes for different folks

None of the above

Moral relativism

Moral diversity thesis

Ethical relativism

Universality thesis

None of the above

The unity thesis is false

The moral diversity thesis is true

Moral relativism is true

Context-sensitivity

Matters of morality are universal

Matters of morality of absolute

There are objective truths

Morality does not depend on a person's desires, interests, or goals

All of the above

None of the above

Moral diversity thesis

Cultural relativism

Descriptive relativism

All of the above

B and C only

None of the above

Different cultures have different moral norms

The moral code of a society determines what is right and what is wrong in that society

There is no objective and independent standard to judge the practices and institutions of other cultures

Our moral code has no special status

None of the above

False

True

Valid but unsound

Invalid

Invalid but sound

The practice of infanticide endorsed by members of my culture is morally permissible

The practice of infanticide endorsed by members of my culture is morally impermissible

The practice of infanticide endorsed by members of a different culture is morally permissible

The practice of infanticide endorsed by members of a different culture is morally impermissible

All of the above

B, C, D only

Our moral views may turn out to be mistaken

It makes it difficult to makes sense of what seems to be commonsensical moral concepts

All truths (not merely moral truths) are susceptible to relativity

There can be no genuine disagreement about moral matters

None of our preferences and practices are based on some absolute and independent standard

Not all of our preferences and practices are based on some absolute and independent standard

All of our preferences and practices are based on some absolute and independent standard

There is no single true morality

We should not conclude anything from this fact

A difference in fundamental moral beliefs

A difference in non-fundamental moral beliefs

A difference in non-moral beliefs

All of the above

None of the above

All moral judgments make sense only in relation to and with reference to some implicit agreement or tacit understanding about their relations with one another.

Some, but not all, judgments make sense only in relation to and with reference to some implicit agreement or tacit understanding about their relations with one another.

No moral judgment makes sense only in relation to and with reference to some implicit agreement or tacit understanding about their relations with one another.

Non-inner judgements make sense only in relation to and with reference to some implicit agreement or tacit understanding about their relations with one another.

Entail claims about what people have reasons do to

Typically presuppose that the speaker endorses the reasons the speaker takes the agent to have

Typically presuppose that the audience endorses the reasons the speaker takes the agent to have

All of the above

Entail claims about value

A necessary condition for a consideration R to be a reason for agent A to do D is that R is related to A's subjective motivational set

A sufficient condition for a consideration R to be a reason for agent A to do D is that R is related to A's subjective motivational set

Both A and B

Neither A nor B

Beliefs

Desires

Values

Intentions

Plans

It ought not be the case that Juliana sacrifices her first-born to honour the flying spaghetti monster

The practice of sacrificing one's first-born endorsed by Juliana and members of her community is morally egregious

Sacrificing one's first-born in order to honour the flying spaghetti monster is morally wrong

Like every other member of her community, Juliana ought not sacrifice her first-born to honour the flying spaghetti monster

Both C and D

The moral diversity thesis

It best explains certain aspects of our moral thought and discourse

Facts about how people use the words 'ought' and 'morally wrong'

Harman doesn't offer a reason to support his version of moral relativism

No, morality is relative

Yes, Harman's brand of relativism is sophisticated

I don't know, Harman's brand of relativism is inconsistent

I don't know, I don't fully understand Harman's brand of moral relativism

Both Jones and Smith are knights

Jones is a knight and Smith is a knave

Jones is a knave and Smith is a knight

Both Jones and Smith are knaves

There is not enough information to determine what are Jones and Smith

Explaining why it is morally permissible in some cases to kill one person in order to save five, but not morally permissible in other cases

Explaining why it is morally required in some cases to kill one person in order to save five, but not morally required in other cases

Explaining why it is morally permissible to push a fat man over a bridge in order to stop a runaway trolley that will otherwise hit and kill five people, but not morally permissible for a transplant surgeon to kill one person in order to harvest their organs and transplant them into five dying patients

Explaining why killing is not always worse than letting die

The driver case

The bystander at the switch case

The fat man case

The mayor case

All of the above

The act consists in diverting a threat to the five onto the one

The act does not directly violate the one’s stringent rights

The act is one whose maxim is universalizable

Both A and B

None of the above

If and only if she could have acted otherwise

If she could have acted otherwise

Only if she could have acted otherwise

Only if determinism is false

Many people believe it to be true

The objectivity of morality presupposes it to be true

It is an analytic truth

It is a generalized version of the idea that coercion and moral responsibility are mutually exclusive

None of the above

There is a circumstance that makes it sufficient that someone could not have acted otherwise

The circumstance that makes it sufficient that someone could not have acted otherwise plays an appropriate role in explaining why you did what you did

both A and B

None of the above

Jones is coerced into rigging the state lottery

Jones is not coerced into rigging the state lottery

There is no fact of the matter whether Jones is coerced into rigging the state lottery

Jones is coerced into rigging the state lottery but is nevertheless morally responsible for rigging the state lottery

The case of Phyllis

The case of Dwight

The case of Kelly

The case of Meredith

A person is not morally responsible for what they have done if they did it because they could not have done otherwise

A person is not morally responsible for what they have done if they did it only because they could not have done otherwise

A person is not morally responsible for what they have done only if they were coerced to do it

A person is not morally responsible for what they have done if they did it as a result of working for Michael Scott

Everyone has free will

No one has free will

Some people don’t have free will

Some people have free will

Free will is an illusion

While every event in the world is causally determined, some people have free will

Every event in the world is causally determined, which is incompatible with the idea that some people have free will

Some people have free will, and that is incompatible with the idea that every event in the world is causally determined

Given the past and the laws of nature, the future is determined in every detail

The principle of planned parenthood

The principle of plausible possession

The principle of possible prevention

The principle of plausible possibilities

The agent could not have done otherwise

The agent could not have prevent the event (or state of affairs) from happening (obtaining)

The agent is morally responsible for the event (or state of affairs)

Both b and c

None of the above

We are morally assessable only to the extent that we what are assessed for is morally praiseworthy

We are morally assessable only to the extent that we could have done otherwise

We are morally assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factor under our control

None of the above

Thought directed at one’s action

Thought about how much better it would have been otherwise

Can extend beyond what one does intentionally

Calls for compensation or restitution on the part of the agent

Gauguin’s decision was not justified

Gauguin’s decision was justified

Gauguin’s decision was unjustified

Both B and C

None of the above

Constitutive luck

Contributive luck

Resultant luck

Causal luck

Circumstantial luck

Ultimate regret need not be moral regret

Rational justification is not immune to luck

Both A and B

None of the above

Accept moral luck and reject the control condition

Deny moral luck and revise our moral practices

Deny moral luck and keep our moral practices intact

There is no solution to the problem of moral luck

All three are knights

All three are knaves

Peggy is the only knight

Joe is the only knight

Zippy is the only knight

Peggy is the only knave

Joe is the only knave

Zippy is the only knave

There is not enough information to determine what Peggy, Joe, and Ziggy are

The problem of trying to explain the wrongness done onto certain kinds of people that do not seem to be harmed in any kind of way

The problem of trying to explain why two seemingly nonidentical things are, in fact, identical

The problem of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’

The problem of deriving an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’

A kind of thought-experiment or example

Persons who are caused to have necessarily flawed existence

Cases of two things that are not identical to each other

None of the above

X wrongs Y

The way that X wrongs Y is by causing Y harm

X causes Y harm by making Y worse off than Y otherwise would have been

Y is worse off than they otherwise would have been

None of the above

Pretend it doesn’t exist

Identify which member of the set of inconsistent claims that generates the problem is false

Provide an error theory that explains why we naturally thought some false claim was true

Both B and C

None of the above

By denying that people described in putative examples of nonidentity cases are wronged

By denying that people described in putative examples of nonidentity cases are made worse off

By shifting the locus of harm from identity cases to their creators

All of the above

Both B and C

None of the above

By denying that people described in putative examples nonidentity cases are made worse off

By shifting the focus on nonidentity cases to the value of the state of affairs brought about by the existence of a necessary flawed life

By focusing on the rights of future people

All of the above

Both A and B

None of the above

By explaining the sense in which nonidentity cases are wronged

By denying that nonidentity cases are wronged

By arguing that future people have the right not to intentionally be brought into a life that contains a defective life stage

Both A and C

None of the above

Proving too much

Begging the question

Committing the strawman fallacy

Circular reasoning

A is better than B

B is better than A

A is just as good as B

The Average Principle does not apply in this case

A is better than B

B is better than A

A is just as good as B

The Total Principle does not apply here

Some lives are objectively better than others

Compared with the existence of very many people, all of whom have a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger number of people whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though these people would have lives that are barely worth living

Compared with the existence of very many people, all of whom have a very high quality of life, it would be better if those whose quality of life was lowest did not exist

Some lives are not worth living at all

Deny that a world in which there is much more people—each of which has a life worth living, but, on average, has a lesser quality of life than people living in a less populated world—is better than such a less populated world, regardless of the total sum of happiness in each world.

Argue that a world in which there is much more people—each of which has a life worth living, but, on average, has a lesser quality of life than people living in a less populated world—would lack some of the things that make life worth living

Both A and B

Parfit claims we should hesitantly accepts the repugnant conclusion

The idea that the better than relation is transitive

The idea that the better than relation is not transitive

The idea that it is better to have five minutes of ecstasy than ten minutes of pleasure only slightly less intense than ecstasy

The idea that it is better to endure a pounding migraine for five minutes than endure a mild headache for a week

None of the above

X = Y

X is the sibling of Y

X is taller than Y

X is the coach of Y

X is faster than Y

You shouldn’t trust anybody

It may be rational for two rational agents to choice do something that’s not in each of their best interest

You should never cooperate with the police

Cooperation requires mutual trust

The choice to confess

The choice to remain silent

The choice to confess if the accomplice remains silent

The choice to remain silent if the accomplice confesses

The principle of utility and the dominance principle

The principle of equality and the dominance principle

The principle of utility and the principle of equality

The principle of expected utility and the dominance principle

Choose one box (box B)

Choose both boxes

Such a person will invariably be caught in a vicious regress and will never settle on a choice

Choose the spotted cheetah in the corner of the room

All three are knights

All three are knaves

Smith is the only knight

Jones is the only knight

Pita is the only knight

Smith is the only knave

Jones is the only knave

Pita is the only knave

There is not enough information to determine what Smith, Jones, and Pita are

All three are knights

All three are knaves

Jones is the only knight

Smith is the only knight

Brown is the only knight

Jones is the only knave

Smith is the only knave

Brown is the only knave

There is not enough information to determine what Jones, Smith, and Brown are