Intoxication

[blank_start]Ashworth[blank_end] developed the Doctrine of [blank_start]Prior Fault[blank_end], which essentially means that if D cannot benefit from a defence that was a result of his or her own [blank_start]prior fault[blank_end]. He also stated that the intoxicated [blank_start]mens rea[blank_end] is less than the intoxicated actus reus.

[blank_start]Horder[blank_end] argues that intoxication can be no [blank_start]defence[blank_end].

[blank_start]Williams[blank_end] suggests that there are [blank_start]two problems[blank_end] with the current rules of law regarding [blank_start]intoxication[blank_end]: 1. The current rules on intoxication punish the [blank_start]intoxication[blank_end] itself. 2. The current rules on intoxication can only be applied to a limited [blank_start]range[blank_end] of cases. She also mentions that it is clear that the Courts wish to [blank_start]criminalise[blank_end] intoxication itself, and more than the current [blank_start]rules[blank_end] allow.

Finch and [blank_start]Munro[blank_end] state that although the courts hold that a [blank_start]drunken mistake[blank_end] is not a reasonable or [blank_start]honest mistake[blank_end] to make, this is not within the interest of the [blank_start]general public[blank_end].

The law will never allow [blank_start]Dutch Courage[blank_end] as a defence. This is where D [blank_start]voluntarily[blank_end] drinks or takes drugs to conjure up the [blank_start]courage[blank_end] to commit a crime. [blank_start]Policy[blank_end] reasons: People would simply drink before they committed any crime, so that they had a [blank_start]defence or excuse[blank_end] mitigating their [blank_start]behaviour[blank_end]. A-G of [blank_start]NI v Gallagher[blank_end]: A man wanted to [blank_start]kill[blank_end] his wife so drank some [blank_start]whiskey[blank_end]. The Court held that [blank_start]self-induced[blank_end] drunkenness will not be a [blank_start]defence[blank_end] to murder.

If D can form the [blank_start]mens rea[blank_end] of the offence, then the [blank_start]defence of intoxication[blank_end] is not available. It does not matter [blank_start]how[blank_end] or why you got intoxicated. [blank_start]Sheehan v Moore[blank_end] per Lane L.J: "A [blank_start]drunken[blank_end] intent is [blank_start]nevertheless[blank_end] an intent."

If you [blank_start]misjudge[blank_end] the necessity of force, self-defence will not be allowed. A [blank_start]drunken mistake[blank_end] is not a reasonable and [blank_start]honest[blank_end] mistake to make. ([blank_start]O'Grady[blank_end], 1987) [blank_start]Hatton[blank_end] (2005) - D cannot "rely on any [blank_start]mistaken belief[blank_end] attributable to intoxication that was [blank_start]voluntary[blank_end]." This has been confirmed in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, [blank_start]s76(5)[blank_end].

[blank_start]Basic intent[blank_end] crimes = an offence that is able to happen [blank_start]without intention[blank_end], e.g. assault, [blank_start]battery[blank_end] Specific intent [blank_start]crimes[blank_end] = only [blank_start]intention[blank_end] will [blank_start]suffice[blank_end], e.g. murder, GBH with [blank_start]intent[blank_end]

D is [blank_start]voluntarily intoxicated[blank_end] when he or she knowingly takes the drugs or alcohol. Voluntary intoxication will not generally be a [blank_start]defence[blank_end], but in some circumstances, it can act as a [blank_start]partial defence[blank_end]. These circumstances are, however, very [blank_start]rare[blank_end].

[blank_start]Allen[blank_end] (1987) - a [blank_start]mistake[blank_end] as to the nature of the substance is entirely [blank_start]irrelevant[blank_end] to D's plea.

[blank_start]Hardie[blank_end] (1984) is a case governing [blank_start]involuntary intoxication[blank_end]. It states that prescription drugs should allow for a [blank_start]complete[blank_end] defence.

[blank_start]Kingston[blank_end] (1984) is a case governing [blank_start]involuntary[blank_end] intoxication. On the conviction of D for his [blank_start]sexual assault[blank_end] of a young boy whilst involuntarily [blank_start]intoxicated[blank_end], Lord [blank_start]Mustill[blank_end] argued that it is not about the [blank_start]moral wrongness[blank_end] of the conduct, but the fact that it is a [blank_start]criminal offence[blank_end],

[blank_start]Majewski[blank_end] (1976) is a case governing [blank_start]voluntary[blank_end] intoxication. It holds that if D is [blank_start]reckless[blank_end] in his conduct of getting intoxicated, this shows [blank_start]beyond reasonable[blank_end] doubt that he took a [blank_start]risk[blank_end] he was aware of.

[blank_start]Caldwell[blank_end] (1982) confirmed Majewski. Lord Diplock said that [blank_start]Majewski[blank_end] is an authority that "[blank_start]self-induced[blank_end] intoxication is no [blank_start]defence[blank_end] to a crime in which [blank_start]recklessness[blank_end] alone is enough to constitute the necessary [blank_start]mens rea.[blank_end]"

D is [blank_start]involuntarily intoxicated[blank_end] where the consumption is not [blank_start]deliberate[blank_end] or where it is pursuant to doctor's orders or caused by a non-dangerous [blank_start]drug.[blank_end] D may have a [blank_start]complete[blank_end] defence if he or she is involuntarily intoxicated and does not form the correct [blank_start]mens rea[blank_end] for the offence. If D has formed the correct mens rea for the [blank_start]offence,[blank_end] despite being involuntarily intoxicated, D will have no [blank_start]defence[blank_end].

[blank_start]Ormerod[blank_end] states two problems caused by the Court of Appeal's attempt to reconcile [blank_start]Majewski[blank_end] with the intentional element of section 3 of the [blank_start]Sexual Offences Act 2003[blank_end]: 1. It is unclear how we should deal with the example raised in [blank_start]Heard[blank_end], concerning a 'D who intends to avoid [blank_start]actual physical[blank_end] contact, but realises that he may touch and is [blank_start]reckless[blank_end] as to whether he will or not.' The court concluded that a 'reckless touching will not do for [blank_start]s3[blank_end].' 2. [blank_start]Lipman[blank_end] is a [blank_start]result crime[blank_end]; however, when dealing with s3, the problem is increasingly difficult. The court wanted the [blank_start]policy rules[blank_end] of Majewski to apply to s3, even though their [blank_start]strict logic[blank_end] could not do so.