Licences and Proprietary Estoppel

Licences: Licences are about permission which a load owner grants another person to be present on their land, use the land or to occupy the land.  This does not create an interest in the land, it merely makes the action lawful The licencee is under a prima face duty to not interfere with the licencor's land without permission. Without the licence there would be a breach of this duty.  The licencor is not under a duty to allow to licencee to use his land. There is no wrong committed if the permission is revoked. A licence is not a right, but a liberty.   Bare Licences: A bare licence provides no consideration for permission to be present It can be granted either expressly or impliedly Ribson v Hallett: If gate outside house is not locked, there is an implied licence to allow a person to continue to the front door. Revocation of a bare licence must be clear.Gillian: Swearing does not result in revocation, it is merely abuse. Revocation must be clear. A Bare licence is purely personal between the licencor and licencee- it cannot be enforceable against a third party. Licences Coupled with an Interest:If a granted interest or right is only enforceable upon entering the land, the licence will include the liberty to enter the land.Hurst v Picture Theatres: Plaintiff purchased a ticket for theatre. The licence was coupled with a grant and so ejection form the theatre on mistaken grounds was assault.  Hounslow LBC: A licence coupled with an interest cannot be revoked if the interest right still exists. Contractual Licence: Licence provides consideration for permission to be present.  At Common Law a contractual licence is revocable.  Wood v Leadbitter: Plaintiff purchased ticket for a meeting and was asked to leave. He refused to leave and was forcibly removed. As this was a contractual licence it could be revoked- this did not amount to assault. At equity, a contractual licence MAY be revocable. Wintergarden Theatre: Defendant granted the plaintiff a licence to use theatre for 6 months. The defendant revoked the licence. At equity, the licence is only revocable if there is a negative clause which allows for it. Verall v Great Yarmouth: Council allowed national front to use town hall. The Council alter revoked the licence. The court ordered specific performance of the contract. An event ticket suggests that there is an irrevocable contractual term. The shorter the event the more likelihood there is an irrevocable terms, the longer the event the more likely there is a revocable term. Alienability: At Common law, a licence is purely personal and so is not enforceable against a third party. Licences are not Alienable. King v David Allen: Plaintiff granted a contractual licence to Defendant to put posters on a wall of a cinema. Once the cinema was fully built the defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to put their posters up. Held, the licence was only enforceable against the Defendant, the plaintiff had no licence to put posters up. Errington v Errington Woods:  Father-in-law purchased a house for his son and daughter-in-law to live in under his name alone. The father then became ill and died. The mother inherited the house. The mother brought an action to remove her daughter-in-law from the house.  Held, the licensee could restrain revocation of the licence by the licensor for its agreed duration only (i.e. as a contractual licence it could not be revoked). Denning believed there was no reason the licence cannot continue onwards to a third party when a licence is supported by equity, this gives it proprietary interest. It is unsure as to whether a contractual licence can actually bind a third party if it is non-proprietary.Ashburn Ansalt v Arnold: confirmed that Contractual licences could not be interests in land. Errington v Errington had no precedence to support it.  They were personal rights between licensor and licensee only. They can therefore not bind third parties. A contractual licence may take effect behind a constructive trust and thus be enforceable against the purchaser. However, the purchaser must have agreed to buy the land subject to the licence.Binions v Evans: Purchaser had attempted to kick out widow from cottage which her husband's company had promised her to live in. The third party purchaser was bound by this licence. 

Proprietary Estoppel: A court may award an interest in land as a remedy against a land owner who has conducted himself in such a way that it is unconscionable for him to exert his legal right in the land. This provides for the informal creation of interests in land where one has acted detrimentally to another.Generally in order for proprietary rights to arise, formalities are required (except in the case of a lease less than 3 years)Certainty of interests in law through formalities means flexibility and fairness is often sacrificed. If one claims they have a right in land without formalities, despite how unfair it is, the rights will not be allowed. Proprietary estoppel grew to mitigate the strictness and issues arising from this reliance on formalities. Wilmott v Barber: The owner of the land could only be prevented from asserting his legal title if he acquiesces when a mistake is made by the claimants in relation to the land. 5 Probanda/ 5 essential characteristics of proprietary estoppel. Taylor Fashions: Claim relating to unconscionably and constructive trusts. Constructive trusts had become limited, proprietary estoppel became a "substitute" for this.  Claimant must show there was an assurance by land owner which gave rise to the expectation that he/she had an interest in the land There must be reliance upon the assurance They must have acted to their detriment upon reliance of the assurance.  Gillett v Holt: Each requirement relies upon one another if proprietary estoppel is to be found. The whole matter is to be considered i.e. the holistic approach.  Assurance:Acted on the basis that there was an interest in the land, not merely an action through mistake. The assurance is the "bridge" between the expectation in land and actions of the owner. Re Bashum: A has acted to his detriment on a belief known or encouraged by B. Active Assurance: words or conduct leads the Claimant to believe they have some interest in the land. Pascoe v Turner: Claimed house is "yours and everything in it". This sufficiently amounts to active assurance. Yeoman v Cobbe: Cobbe had agreed with Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd (YRML) that he would get planning permission for the development of a property owned by YRML. When that had been achieved the property would be transferred to him. He would carry out the development works and the profits from the sale of the property would be shared between them according to a profit-sharing formula. No written contract existed but the parties had agreed on many of the essential terms. Cobbe knew that there was no legal commitment until contracts had been exchanged. HoL rejected the award of a proprietary remedy. The claimant must have an expectation of a ‘certain interest in land.’ Mr Cobbe did not satisfy this since he was fully aware that there was no binding contract. "proprietary estoppel can only act as a shield and not as a sword”. Even if there had been a concluded oral agreement, there was no reason why Yeoman should be estopped from arguing that it was not enforceable because it was not in writing. There must be a confident expectation that one has an interest in the land. Both parties here knew that the argument was not binding. The assurance must be clear and unequivocal- this appears to be contradictory. Thorner v Major: Thorner worked without pay on the farm owned by his father’s cousin. It was found as a fact that he had given assurances to David that he would inherit the farm. These assurances were in very vague terms but it was found as a fact that in the context of the personalities and relationship involved they were clear enough and had been understood and relied on. Peter died without leaving a will.  ‘It was enough that the meaning he conveyed would reasonably have been understood as intended to be taken seriously as an assurance which could be relied upon.’ The assurance must be ‘clear enough’ but it did not have to be clear, precise and unambiguous (especially when the assurance is oral or to be implied from behaviour). Thorner has made it easier to establish that assurances had been made in a family context, where precise words are not used. It is enough for a general assurance to be made about the future of the land. Assurance must be considered from the whole context and so may arise orally, from conduct or from a written instrumentThorner also claims it is “sufficient if the claimant reasonably relies on the assurance, even if the landowner did not intend that he should so rely”. Here, proprietary estoppel was used as a sword (it generated new rights) as opposed to a shield. Ramsden v Dyson: Passive acquiescence to the claimant's act may give rise to passive assurance. Once assurance is given, generally it cannot be revoked.  Taylor v Dickens: Old lady changed mind of leaving house to gardener but later changed her mind. This assurance could not give rise to estoppel as she had not encouraged the belief that she would not change her Will. Gillett v Holt: Taylor v Dickens was too harsh. The revocable characteristic of a Will does not mean an assurance can be revoked. An assurance is essentially a promise.  Reliance:Where a representation has been made and the claimant has acted to his detriment, there is a presumption that reliance exists. Coombes v Smith: Coombes and Smith were having an affair and he bought a house for them. He later said that she and their daughter could only live there until her daughter was 17. Held, the decision to leave her husband was not relied upon the land itself but rather the want to have a relationship with him. Therefore there was no real detriment based upon assurances of the land but rather . Detriment:Gillett v Holt: there has to be a change in position. Suffering financial damage may amount to detriment. Pascoe v Turner: improving on decorating the house amounts to detriment. Re Basham: non- financial personal damage may amount to a detriment. Does not have to be purely financial eg. looking after someone beyond "acts of normal love and affection". Jennings v Rice: Jennings had worked for free for Rice even sleeping on the sofa in her home to look after her. Rive encouraged Jennings to believe that he would receive a substantial sum under the terms of her will. Despite this, she died without making a will. At first instance, J was originally awarded GBP 200,000. J appealed on the basis that the promises made to him had lead him reasonably to expect a more generous share of her estate. Upheld the original award. The aim of the award in a proprietary estoppel case is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result. The size of the award depends on all of the circumstances including the expectation that has been encouraged and the detriment that has been suffered. Regard has to be had to the proportion between the expectation and the damage.Satisfying the Estoppel:Plimmer: There must be satisfaction of the Estoppel by the award of a remedy depending on the facts of the case. Gillet v Holt: satisfaction of Estoppel was done by conveying the Freehold. Grant v Williams: a grant of a lease (or share of ownership) may amount to satisfaction of the Estoppel.Dodsworth: Compensation is only awarded in cases where there are no other damages available. Appleby v Cowley: in some cases there may be no remedy. Griffiths: the court has discretion as to how the remedy should be applied. The satisfaction must be just and fair. Jennings v Rice: The aim of the award in a proprietary estoppel case is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result. The size of the award depends on all of the circumstances including the expectation that has been encouraged and the detriment that has been suffered. Regard has to be had to the PROPORTION between the expectation and damage when awarding satisfaction. Priority:LRA 2002 s116: equity in estoppel has effect from where the equity arises. It is capable of binding successors subject to the rules of priority. An Estoppel Equity will not get priority over pre-registered interest as it is not a registered disposition. LRA 2002 s29: a registered disposition (freehold or lease more than 7 years) will take priority over an equitable estoppel unless it is protectedAn equitable interest is protected  either as a notice under the register or under SCHEDULE 3 as ACTUAL OCCUPATION.  Estoppel licences:Occupational licences are created through the process of Estoppel in order to satisfy the estoppel equity. It can generally not be revoked. LRA 2002 s116: once the court had awarded an estoppel licence as a remedy, the licence cannot be binding upon a third-party purchaser. 

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