Background: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice
applied for admission to the University of California
Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times.
The school reserved sixteen places in each entering
class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part
of the university's affirmative action program, in an
effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority
exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's
qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded
those of any of the minority students admitted in the
two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke
contended, first in the California courts, then in the
Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission
solely on the basis of race.
Question: Did the University of California
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, by practicing an affirmative action
policy that resulted in the repeated
rejection of Bakke's application for
admission to its medical school?
Conclusion: No and yes. There was no single
majority opinion. Four of the justices contended
that any racial quota system supported by
government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the
deciding vote ordering the medical school to
admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell
argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as
employed at the school violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The remaining four justices held that the use of
race as a criterion in admissions decisions in
higher education was constitutionally
permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well,
contending that the use of race was permissible
as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court
managed to minimize white opposition to the
goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while
extending gains for racial minorities through
affirmative action.
Adarand Contractors v. Pena
Background: Adarand, a contractor specializing in
highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a
subcontractor for part of a project funded by the
United States Department of Transportation. Under
the terms of the federal contract, the prime
contractor would receive additional compensation if it
hired small businesses controlled by "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause
declared that "the contractor shall presume that
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals
include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities...." Federal law requires such a
subcontracting clause in most federal agency
contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales
Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was
certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The
prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid
had it not been for the additional payment for hiring
Gonzales.
Question: Is the presumption of disadvantage based
on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored
treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the
equal protection principle embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion: Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547),
the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by
federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny
review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling
government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further
that interest." The Court added that compensation programs
which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would
be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However,
since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of
disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all
race-based classifications must be judged under the strict
scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not
in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The
Court remanded for a determination of whether the
Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.
Baker v. Carr
Background: Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee
citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the
seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually
ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's
reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic
growth and population shifts within the state.
Question: Did the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over questions of
legislative apportionment?
Conclusion: In an opinion which explored the nature of
"political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action
in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to
be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment
was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice Brennan
provided past examples in which the Court had intervened
to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to
state administration and the officers through whom state
affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which
Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial
evaluation.
Reynolds v. Simms
Background: In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (Vann v.
Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and
other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama,
challenged the apportionment of the state legislature.
The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each
county was entitled to at least one representative and
that there were to be as many senatorial districts as
there were senators. Population variance ratios of as
great as 41-to-1 existed in the Senate.
Questions: Did Alabama's apportionment scheme
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause by mandating at least one representative per
county and creating as many senatorial districts as
there were senators, regardless of population
variances?
Decision: In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the challenge to the
Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less
than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...."
Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political
system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had
to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest
and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as
practicable.
Wesberry v. Sanders
Background: James P. Wesberry, Jr. filed a suit
against the Governor of Georgia, Carl E. Sanders,
protesting the state's apportionment scheme. The
Fifth Congressional District, of which Wesberry was
a member, had a population two to three times
larger than some of the other districts in the state.
Wesberry claimed this system diluted his right to
vote compared to other Georgia residents.
Question: Did Georgia's congressional districts
violate the Fourteenth Amendment or deprive
citizens of the full benefit of their right to vote?
Conclusion: The Court held that Georgia's apportionment
scheme grossly discriminated against voters in the Fifth
Congressional District. Because a single congressman had to
represent two to three times as many people as were
represented by congressmen in other districts, the Georgia
statute contracted the value of some votes and expanded the
value of others. The Court recognized that "no right is more
precious" than that of having a voice in elections and held that
"[t]o say that a vote is worth more in one district than in
another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas
of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of
a House of Representatives elected 'by the People. . .'"
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US
Background: Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public
accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia,
refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II.
Question: Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause
powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers?
Conclusion: The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of
commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the
applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the
interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation
had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation.
Brown v. Board of Education
Background: This case was the consolidation of four cases arising in
separate states relating to the segregation of public
schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases,
African American minors had been denied admittance
to certain public schools based on laws allowing public
education to be segregated by race. They argued that
such segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were
denied relief based on the precedent set by Plessy v.
Ferguson, which established the “separate but equal”
doctrine that stated separate facilities for the races
was constitutional as long as the facilities were
“substantially equal.” In the case arising from
Delaware, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that
the African American students had to be admitted to
the white public schools because of their higher
quality facilities.
Question: Does the segregation of public
education based solely on race
violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Conclusion: Yes. Chief Justice Earl
Warren delivered the opinion of the
unanimous Court. The Supreme Court
held that “separate but equal” facilities
are inherently unequal and violate the
protections of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court also held that the segregation
of public education based on race
instilled a sense of inferiority that had a
hugely detrimental effect on the
education and personal growth of
African American children.