TEST: (Issue-State
regulation of industry and
commerce)
(1) Is this a dormant commerce
clause issue? Has Congress
spoken? If yes, then Federal
law trumps State law if they are
in conflict. If no, First consider:
• Is State acting as a Market Participant? If
yes, then commerce clause analysis does not
apply. If state discriminates and favors its
own citizens it’s ok.
If no, (i.e. if State is acting as a
regulator) then you have to ask (2) and
apply the rest of the dormant commerce
clause tests:
(2) Does the law
discriminate against
commerce?
If yes, then ask:
(1) Is this statute motivated by
economic protectionism or is there a
legitimate state interest?
(a) If it’s protectionist, then
it’ll be per se invalid.
(b) If there’s a legitimate
state interest, then ask
(2) Can we accomplish
the state interest through
a less discriminatory
means?
• If yes, statute will be
upheld. [Court will almost
always find that there was an
alternative]
If it doesn’t discriminate, it’s generally
applied to interstate and intrastate
commerce, then apply these questions-
(1) Does the state law have a legitimate
state purpose? i.e. Is it a POLICE
POWER that has to do with the health of
general welfare of its citizens?
(2) Does the state law rationally serve the
legitimate state interest? i.e. is there a
rational relationship between the law and
state interest?
(3) Balancing Test:
Do the benefits to the State from
this law outweigh the burden to
interstate commerce?
If yes, the state will be valid
even if it does burden
commerce to an extent.
Discriminating on Interstate Commerce: Means
whether you are discriminating a something based
on its source. Treating a product differently
because of where it came from.
• The volume of commerce affected does not matter
in determining whether a state has discriminated
against interstate commerce. Statute that requires
electric plants to use 10% coal is invalid. Oklahoma
can compete for 100% while out of staters can only
compete for 90%.
Annotations:
1. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach
An Ohio statute denies arebate to ethanol that comes from states that don’t grant a tax credit to ethanol from Ohio. Basically, ifKentucky gives a rebate to Ohio produced ethanol, then Ohio gives a rebate to Kentucky. Ohio also gives a cashsubsidy. Other states are left our if they don’t have a tax rebate statute. Some states are benefited by the tax credit statute, but it stilldiscriminates on other states that don’t do the rebate. Indiana can’t get a rebate because theyrepealed their rebate statute. HELD: cash subsidy granted to New Energy Co. is fine, but discriminatory taxation of out of state manufacturersviolates the Commerce Clause. “The Commerce Clause doesn’t prohibit all state action designed to give the residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce.”
• State
is telling other states what to do-it’s not their business to foster interstate
commerce.
Note: The court is more likely to accept a valid police
power interest. It’s likely to do this if the state regulation
does not act as a complete bar on interstate commerce. If
there’s an alternative route, the court is more likely to find
that statute valid.
Annotations:
1. Distinguishing
Buck and Bradley:
a. In
Buck, Washington denied a license to
travel from Washington and Oregon. Court
says it’s unconst. Because there is a prohibition of competition. Remember Congress has power to determine
“channels” and facilities of commerce (see Lopez)
b. In
Bradley, Ohio denies Bradley a
license to run a truck from Cleveland to Michigan. Where the state says that the purpose of the
statute is safety-congestion, it’s likeable by the Court. (it’s a police power-health, safety,
welfare)
• Analysis: If state interest is to keep business out,
courts strike it down. In Buck there is
a total prohibition; it is a denial to take any route. However, in Bradley, P can’t use one
particular route but he is free to come up with an alternate route.
1. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Barnwell
S.C. passes a
statute that trucks can’t be wider than 90 inches. Other states allow their truck to be
longer. If you have a 95 in. truck, you have to go around the highway.
HELD: Upheld. Roads are a local matter and this is a safety concern. Court is deferential to state legislature. There is a rational relationship between regulating truck length and safety.
Construct your test for
Constitutionality of state regulations
under commerce clause:
1. Is this a dormant commerce clause issue? Yes.
(states are free to regulate)
2. Does the state statute discriminate
against interstate commerce? No. It places
same burdens in the state as out of state.
Law doesn’t single out any state.
Apply: Generally Applicable Law Prongs
Note: If state law doesn’t discriminate, it’s more likely to
be upheld because it’s a generally applicable law. If it’s
a burdensome law, people in the state will complain to
their legislature. The law is probably reasonable if it
burdens people in the state and out of the state just the
same. (but if burden it on out of staters, they can’t do
anything about it because they can’t complain to the
legislature)
4.Court looks at three prongs for the
generally applicable laws:
(1) Is there a legitimate state interest?
(2) Does law rationally serve the safety interest?
(relationship between means and ends) No. There was
evidence that safety was actually jeapordized because
there were more accidents as result of this law.
(3) Do the burdens on
commerce outweigh the
benefits?
Annotations:
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
This is a case
dealing with state regulation of railroad car size. Railroads are not a matter of local concern
(like highways). This is declared a
burden on commerce,
HELD: Court says the burdens on interstate commerce
outweigh the safety interest. Court
doesn’t want to say there’s no rational basis (questioning Congressional
wisdom)