The two positions were totally interdependent, since defeat of either force would necessitate the withdrawal of
the other. Buckley, p. 171
Inevitable?
Persian resources unimpaired – not a defeat
Death of Dareios 486 BC
Revolt in Egypt 485 BC
481 BC Massive preparations under way
Canal dug – connection between Mount Athos Peninsular to Chalkidike
Double bridge of boats across Hellespont
All preparations open to Greek world
why was 480 different?
Led by Xerxes himself
Why would he decide to do this?
Delphic oracle told the Athenians to ‘fly to the world’s end’ (Hdt.7.140)
Athenians ask for a second message
Attack by land and sea
Xerxes doesn’t demand submission
Results
Persian losses supposedly greater than Greek
4000 Greeks (lots of helots)
20,000 Persians
Probably exaggerated
In three naval battles and two storms the Persian fleet suffered heavy losses
Perhaps half were taken out of action
The morale of the Greeks was not effected
Central Greece now open for invasion
General evacuation ordered in Athens
Importance
Loss of Thermopylae forced the submission of Boeotia
Blame on Sparta?
Excuse on sacred Olympic and Carnean festivals?
Many Peloponnesians did not approve of Themistocles’ policy
The decision of Sparta to delay the dispatch of their main forces
was based on the confidence that an adequate number of troops
had been sent to Thermopylae:
Themistocles’ plan to hold the fleet at Artemisium played a decisive role
The Persian fleet could not divide and make raids against the Peloponnese to make diversions – forced
to pick one fight only
Therefore, they sent their advance guard, not thinking that the campaign at Thermopylae would be
decided so soon. Herodotus 7.206.2 (quoted in Buckley, p. 172)