Con Law Cases

Pregunta	Respuesta
Marbury v. Madison (1803)	Congress, through Judiciary Act of 1789, gave the Supreme Court the authority to issue writs of mandamus to public officers on original jurisdiction; this was unconstitutional. Congress cannot authorize federal courts to hear cases beyond what is specified in Article III, and federal courts cannot gain jurisdiction by consent. Violation of Meta-Question #2 (Jud. Act of 1789 was an ordinary law) and the Constitution is supreme.
Ways to limit judicial power	1. Interpretation (defining acceptable ways to interpret) BOBBIT 2. Stare decisis 3. Standards of Review 4. Justiciability (Political Question Doctrine, Mootness, Ripeness, Standing)
Bobbit's Methods of Constitutional Interpretation	1. History - Founders' Intent 2. Text - Today's definition 3. Structure - between branches 4. Doctrine - stare decisis (5.) Prudence - Costs/ Benefit (Common Sense Good) (6.) Ethos - Locke, Superhero language
Knick v. Township of Scott, Penn, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).	Stare Decisis Overruled due to "Quality of the Reasoning" / Workability of Rule Precedent: Exhaustion of remedies when 5th Am. takings issue (ordinance required homeowners to allow daytime public access to gravesites located on their property). Cannot go straight to federal government without exhausting all state remedies. Supreme Court ignores precedent because previous decision was unworkable.
When You Can Overturn Precedent	1. Workability of the rule it (the previous decision) established 2. Consistency with other related decisions 3. Reliance on the decisions - Can you remove rule without creating harm? 4. Quality of Reasoning - new from Knick case
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).	Whether Congress can establish a Federal Bank: Yes. Whether Maryland can tax that bank: No. If Congress is always subject to court’s interpretation of its actions, Congress will never get anything done. Court must allow Congress to act and act with finality so long as actions are constitutional. Rational Basis Review.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).	Voters in NC and MD challenge states' congressional districting maps. There is no standard to apply to reliably differentiate between unconstitutional gerrymandering and constitutional political gerrymandering. Court not going to answer question. No test. Clarifies Baker’s standard requirement: is the test clear, manageable and fair/ neutral? Dissent’s test excludes some maps, but does not and cannot produce a clear, easily manageable, and neutral standard.
Baker v. Carr (1962).	Districing cases are justiciable. Outlines a test: (1.) Is the dispute clearly assigned to another branch of government by the Constitution? If so, not justiciable. E.g., Impeachment. Text of Const. clearly assigns task to Congress. (2.) Is it hard for the court to develop a standard to resolve the dispute? (3.) Would it require court to undo a complex policy issue (better resolved by legislature)? (4.) Would resolution of the dispute cause the court to show disrespect for another branch of government? (5.) Would the court’s involvement lead to the embarrassment of the United States in some way?
Hamilton and Madison Views on President's Power	Hamilton: Argued for presidential authority/ power. Congress, “All legislative power herein granted…” President, “The executive power” suggests preexisting, not created or imagined. Unitary Executive Madison: Wanted to limit president’s power. Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).	President Truman's Seizing Steel Mills. The President's power, if any, to issue an order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the United States Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property. Nor is there any act of Congress from which such a power can fairly be implied. There is no Constitutional right here. Congress has not authorized it. Jackson's Tripartite Test.
Jackson's Tripartite Test	1. Constitution says okay and Congress has allowed it expressly or impliedly=maximum authority and presumptively constitutional. 2. Constitution allows but Congress has not yet spoken about issue=mid level power. 3. Constitution allows but Congress has expressly forbidden=lowest authority. Must look at Const. authorizing power, e.g., Commander in Chief
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).	President Nixon invoked executive privilege to avoid compliance with a third-party subpoena duces tecum that required the production of tape recordings and documents. Court says President does not have an absolute, unqualified privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. This power, if allowed, would offend Criminal Justice System.
Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (2004).	Lawsuit filed claiming an energy task force, chaired by VP Cheney, violated Federal Advisory Committee Act for having secret meetings. Plaintiffs sought and received discovery order. Invoking executive priv. not required to keep information secret. This is a civil case, Nixon was a criminal one. Information sought in Nixon was paramount to prosecution’s case and administration of justice. Issues of secrecy do not inherently require invocation of executive privilege. Here not
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).	Rational Basis Test (whether there is a conceivable permissible purpose for the government’s action) used for Immigration Restrictions. Travel ban upheld. Take Care Clause. Congress has allowed through INA.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).	Line Item Veto Act re: spending/ tax measures. Even though President has VETO POWER, it applies to entire BILL not to portions. The cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Dissent (Breyer) Government is much bigger now so this should be allowed as practical.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).	Congress passed law permitting president Roosevelt to restrict arms sales to two warring Lattin American nations, Bolivia and Paraguay. Holding: Congress can delegate new foreign powers to the President, here, to restrict arms sales to other countries.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).	President has exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign under the Reception Clause, Art. II, § 3. Congress passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act to allow U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to request including Israel as birth country. Jackson Level 3 BUT president's power is exclusive, conclusive, narrowly assigned to him. Rare. Court wants to show deference WRT foreign affairs/ national security.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).	The U.S. President issued executive orders that nullified all non-Iranian interests in Iranian assets and suspended all settlement claims. This is okay, but Opinion limited to claim settlement executive agreements to settle major foreign policy disputes.
War Powers	Congress: Declare war, raise/support army and navy. Article I President: Commander in Chief, Article II, Wage War
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).	Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was seized in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, and was turned over to U.S. military because he was part of or supporting forces hostile to U.S. or coalition partners in Afghanistan and engaged in an armed conflict against U.S. Commander in Chief power. AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) passed, Non-Detention Act: cannot detain American unless statute says so. AUMF qualifies as a statute. Jackson Category 1.
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).	Eight Nazi saboteurs landed on American soil during WWII. They were carrying explosives and wearing uniforms. They were under German orders to destroy war industries and war facilities in the U.S. President Roosevelt issued Executive Order providing for their trial in a military tribunal. Held constitutional.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).	President (or ex president) has absolute immunity from civil suits related to official actions while in office. Former Air Force management analysis, Fitzgerald, claimed that his job was eliminated in retaliation for his exposing high costs in Defense Department in testimony to Congress. And that such retaliation was unconstitutional.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).	President is not immune from civil suit for actions taken prior to taking office. President Clinton for actions of sexual assault and retaliation by demotion that allegedly took place before his term began, when he was governor of Arkansas. There is no basis for immunity for unofficial conduct. Civil suits of this nature will not unduly interfere with the President’s carrying out the important and unique constitutional functions of the office.
Impeachment	Article II, § 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the U.S. shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. What are high crimes and misdemeanors? (Supreme Court will (1) call this a political question, and won’t touch it/ try to resolve the language/ define these terms, and (2) avoid answering because this is specifically assigned to another branch, the legislature) What procedures must be followed when there is an impeachment and removal proceeding?
Three benefits of protecting state governments	1. Decreasing likelihood of federal tyranny. Judicial review important check against tyrannical government actions. 2. Enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the people. Smaller electorate, elected officials more immediately accountable to the people. 3. Allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas. Can try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. (Brandeis)
The Commerce Clause	Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”
Commerce Clause and the Robber Baron Court	Commerce should exclude attempts by Congress to include: Production Manufacturing Intrastate (local) activity Police Power
Commerce Clause: Congress Can Only Tinker with Three Areas	1. Channels of Interstate Commerce (roads, waterways, railroad, air) 2. Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce (not the means, but the things that actually move in interstate commerce that are traded for value, the goods or services moving between two states) 3. Substantial Relationship to interstate commerce (most problematic and discussed), Regulating Conduct (when or if you can act) that has a substantial relationship with interstate commerce. Can Congress regulate your conduct? Can survive if the following are satisfied: a. Economic Character, b. Jurisdictional Nexus, c. Findings of Fact (Record)
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).	Jones charged with unfair labor practices in violation of National Labor Relations Act of 1935 because it was discriminating against members of the union with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and was coercing and intimidating its employees in order to interfere with their self-organization. Jones says collective bargaining related to production and manufacturing is off limits for Congress to regulate. This is a purely local site. The fact that company engaged in production is not determinative. The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact “all appropriate legislation” for “its protection and advancement,” “to adopt measures” to “promote its growth and insure its safety,” “to foster, protect, control, and restrain.” This particular labor dispute would have a direct, substantial effect on the economy.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).	Darby challenged the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made by employees who were paid less than the prescribed minimum wage (25 cents an hour at the time) or worked more than the maximum number of hours per week (44 hours a week at the time). Local. Manufacturing. BUT risk to national economy. Congress had written the FLSA not to say how factories could be run, but instead that if factories were operated in a way contrary to the Act, businesses were not able to ship those goods out of their states. And the Commerce Clause extends to production. If violating Act, states could get economic advantage by selling goods to other states (that were created at lower costs to violating state). Interstate Commerce extends to activities 10th Am. is a truism.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).	CC. Economic effect in the aggregate. Following an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Secretary of Agriculture Wickard promoted quotas imposed on farmers. Nomenclature=nod to a new way of thining about how to think about the Constitution. Now more functionalist and not formalist. If all farmers did this, if viewed in the aggregate, the price of wheat would go down because supply would be too high. OR if farmers did not buy extra wheat, demand would go down. Since Congress can regulate price for wheat, it can impose quotas or other limits on what can be harvested. So even if one person’s actions don’t have substantial effect, if viewed in the aggregate-if all similarly situated did this-they almost certainly would.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).	Motel owner sought customers/ guests from outside State of Georgia through national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation as well as 50 plus billboards within the state. This is local and it is asserting a values claim (Police Power). Looks like Congress is horning on Police Power. There is overwhelming evidence (nature of the standard of review: don’t forget what standard of review applies. Congress did the work/ research. This is a rational basis review, if Congress is satisfied with its own rational basis, court is not going to interject-Court delegates rational basis test to Congress itself. Rational Basis Review is expanding/ much more permissive) of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. If Congress is involved, it doesn’t matter if morals are involved. If interstate commerce feels the pinch, doesn’t matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze. Concurrence: (Douglas) Concurs in the judgment. Finds 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause more on point to protect against racial discrimination.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

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