Principal hires an agent to represent its interests
Homeowner (principal) hires broker (agent) to sell house
car owner (principal) hires mechanic (agent) to repair car
Stock holders (principal) hires managers (agent) to run the company
Slide 2
Agency Problem
Conflict of interest between principal and agent
Real Estate brokers may not have an incentive to search for the highest selling price
Mechanics may not have the goal of keeping repair costs low
managers may not care abt maximizing shareholder wealth
These problems occur because of asymmetric information and monitoring costs
Slide 3
Information
Brokers have a better understanding of the demand for houses but may wish to sell the house rather than wait for a better offer to come by. They do get a percentage of the sale price, but most of the gain goes to the home owner.
Mechanics have greater info. abt workings of car and possible repair options. They may have an incentive to perform more elaborate repair job when a less costly alternative is sufficient
Slide 4
Information and Incentive
Managers may not have incentive to work to increase shareholder wealth. Its costly to monitor managers.
Slide 5
Solution to agency problem
For brokers and mechanics, use online rating sites.
For managers, use stock options
Require managers to purchase shares of company (using their own money).
Possibility of a corporate takeover can also provide incentive to maximize shareholder wealth.