HUMANS ARE
DIFFERENT due to
ability to carry out
mind-reading and
symbolic
communication
ANY play that
contravenes the
reality of a
situation.
starts with an
OBJECT
SUBSTITUTION
between 18-24
months
SOCIODRAMATIC
PLAY - mini dramas
with other children
or adults - 30
MONTHS
UNIVERSAL, so
INNATE? IN USA
5-20% of time in
2nd year of life
PRETEND PLAY
SYMBOLIC?
appreciate that
real objects can
represent or serve
as symbols for other
objects
Pretend play is
symbolic as the child
must suspend their
knowledge of reality to
engage in pretence
QUARANTINE pretend
situation from real one
children rarely
confused, better at tasks
in pretence that reality!
THEORIES
OF
PRETEND
PLAY
1. FINAL STATE NATIVIST -
INNATE MENTAL
ARCHITECTURE FOR PRETEND
UNDERSTANDING
LESLIE - 1994 and FODOR -
2002 - innate TOM module
enables metarepresentation and
adult concept of pretence from 2
years old
META-
REPRESENTATION
PRIMARY
REPRESENTATION
- X = telephone
LESLIE - 1994 - primary
representations, what it really is.
secondary representations is what the
pretend use for the object is. secondary
representations are meta-representations
and allow the ability for a child to
fantatsise in their own game
META-REPRESENTATION
AND THEORY OF MIND
EVIDENCE FOR A LINK
BETWEEN PRETENCE AND
BELIEF UNDERSTANDING
LESLIE - 1991 and
BARON-COHEN - 1987 -
children with autism fail
false belief and tend not
to engage in pretend
play
TAYLOR AND
CARLSON - 1997 -
children who engage
in more pretend play
pass standard TOM
tasks earlier on
INNATE TOM
module enables
metarepresentation
frequently engaging in pretense, >>
understanding of pretense,
>>understanding others' perspectives
THEORY 2: STARTING STATE
NATIVIST - SIMULATION
ACCOUNTS OF PRETEND
PLAY AND TOM
HARRIS - 2000 - ROLE-TAKING - practicing pretend play may
result in children learning to represent another's perspective
through empathy - appreciate that others can hold different mental
states
IMPROVED SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS - ASTINGTON
& JENKINS - 1995 - better able to
take other's desires into account
ASTINGTON AND BAIRD - 2005 - pretend
play in general is associated with the
understanding of mental representations
DO CHILDREN REALLY
UNDERSTAND
PRETEND PLAY?
LILLARD - 1994 -
"BEHAVING-AS-IF"
THEORIES - initially
activity-based, not based on
understanding mental
representations
LILLARD - 1993 - mos 4 year olds
do not understand the intentional
pre-requisite of pretense. children
construe pretend play as its
external representations such as
costumes and actions
NICHOLS and STICH - 2000 - behaving-as-it
is behaving in a way that would be appropriate if
the counterfacttual situation were the case
INTENTION-READING
AND PRETENCE
INTENTION -
action plan behind
physical
movements
RAKOCZY ET AL -
2004 - understanding
the difference between
pretending to do X
and trying to do X
LOGICAL INFERENCE
within pretence, if he has
pretended to pour water, i
can pretend to drink it
PROBLEMS
WITH
RAKOCZY ET
AL'S STUDY??
Perhaps the children just
noticed the ‘accidental’
different features associated
with the ‘pretending’ vs.
‘trying’ conditions
OBJECTION:
reacted
appropriately to the
logical inference
depending on
whether EXP
intended to try or
intended to pretend.
After the actor ’ s model action children were then given
the object and could act with it themselves.
Three-year-olds (and to some lesser degree 2-yearolds)
very clearly showed that they understood pretending and
trying as such: after trying models, they really performed
the action themselves or tried to really perform it, often
commenting on their failure (e.g. ‘ I cannot do it either ’ ),
but after pretence models they only pretended themselves
and did not care about the real effects of their acts (e.g.
whether there was water coming out of the container).